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THE IBERIAN PENINSULA IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY:
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
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
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THE IBERIAN PENINSULA IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Decades. The pros, cons, and other related problems to such a move are herein discussed.

Spain and Portugal share the Iberian Peninsula -- an important geostrategic area; a synergetic effect can be anticipated through integrated roles for Spain and Portugal under a NATO framework. Despite the current trends of the new Spanish Socialist government to halt Spain's entry into the military structure, this ultimate goal is still a challenge expected to be overcome in the 1980's. The mutual interest by the Iberian countries in NATO will undoubtedly result in a strengthened and united western Europe and a formidable opponent for the Soviet Union to consider.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE IBERIAN PENINSULA IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, by LTC João A. Bento Soares, Portuguese Army, 138 pages.

The advent of democratic regimes in Spain and Portugal by the mid seventies has conveyed new dynamics in the relationship between the two countries which are now trying a full integration in western Europe. For a better understanding of the evolution till present-day situation, a brief historical overview of both countries is also provided.

Spain's adhesion to NATO in 1982 represented a sizeable reinforcement for the West vis a vis the impressive Soviet military establishment during the last decade. The pros, cons and other related problems to such a move are herein discussed.

Spain and Portugal share the Iberian Peninsula -- an important geostrategic area; a synergetic effect can be anticipated through integrated roles for Spain and Portugal under a NATO framework. Despite the current trends of the new Spanish Socialist government to halt Spain's entry into the NATO military structure, this ultimate goal is still a challenge expected to be overcome in the 1980's. The mutual interest by the Iberian countries in NATO will

undoubtedly result in a strengthened and united western Europe and a formidable opponent for the Soviet Union to consider.

DEDICATION

From 1914 to 1921 my Father, Joaquim, now 92, worked in the United States. He returned to Portugal with an unwavering love for America. It is from him I have received my inspiration and guidance and it is to him I dedicate this work.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I. Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the geographical and strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula to NATO in the 1980's. It will focus on the military as well as political problems which have emerged with the advent of democratic regimes in Portugal and Spain and with the recent addition of Spain to NATO. The study is undertaken within the framework of domestic, regional, global and NATO-wide requirements and interests, with a full understanding that alliance systems are never static but are always driven by dynamic inter-relationships, reinforced by technological changes and the state of the global or international system.

II. Research Methods, Limitations and Assumptions

The thesis has been prepared using historical research as the primary method. Together with existing materials in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) I have also used the inter-library loan system and other sources such as the Portuguese and American press and informal personal interviews with the two Spanish officers


attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth. The collected data was the object of a systematic analysis, comparison and continuous evaluation.

The research performed was limited to unclassified material. While constructing arguments, interpreting facts, and drawing conclusions, the author's personal experience and judgement have been used. For this reason, the opinions hereby expanded are affected by an individual effort and vision and are not necessarily coincident with the official views of Portugal, Spain or NATO.

The present new Spanish Socialist Government is apparently willing to delay if not thwart Spain's integration into NATO's military structure. However, our basic assumption is that the dynamic process in Spain will ultimately lead to Spanish military integration into NATO. A second assumption is related to the threat. Within the NATO framework, the Warsaw Pact provides the major threat to the Iberian Peninsula. The so-called North African threat is not viewed as significant at this time, despite the current military build-up of North African states.

III. Development

The Iberian Peninsula is shared by two states, Spain and Portugal (Map 1). An adequate approach to its study requires a geopolitical analysis, which interrelates



MAP 1: The Iberian Peninsula

the different national communities and their geographic space. This is mainly done in Chapters 2 and 3, where a brief historical overview of the Iberian countries is also included.

Chapter 4 deals with the geostrategic significance of the Iberian Peninsula. The potential value of the land space of the peninsular area, the Portuguese archipelagos (Azores and Madeira), and the Spanish positions (Canary and Balearic Islands and the two cities of Ceuta and Melilla), is discussed within the framework of current NATO requirements.

The advantages and disadvantages of Spain's membership in NATO are weighed in Chapter 5. Both NATO and Spanish views are confronted, to include in the latter, some associated perspectives such as Spain's desired access to the European Economic Community (EEC). The impact on Portugal is also evaluated to include the possible reorganization of both countries' domestic military requirements. Further, the yet to be determined role of Spain's Armed Forces in NATO's integrated military structure will be addressed.

In Chapter 6 the threat is briefly evaluated. The steady increase of the Soviet Union military establishment is clearly identified. Particularly important for the scope of this thesis is the impressive development of the Soviet naval threat in the Mediterranean. Thus, a more

detailed analysis and historical overview is conducted in this specific area.

The conclusions will be presented in Chapter 7. The essential idea that the reader must keep in mind is that the treatment of the Iberian Peninsula as a whole accrues a synergetic effect for a potential NATO use.

CHAPTER 2

SPAIN BEFORE AND AFTER FRANCO

I. Spain Before Franco


The Iberians, who gave the name to the peninsula shared by Spain and Portugal were, according to most scholars, the first people who inhabited it on a permanent basis. At least since the sixth century B.C. their presence was acknowledged in the eastern part of Spain. Coming from central Europe, the Celts also entered the peninsula, initially fighting the Iberians but, in time, both peoples intermingled to form the so-called Celtiberians. Simultaneously and for a long period, Greeks and Phoenicians colonized the peninsula establishing positions on the coast. The Carthaginians, established on the northern shore of Africa (near present Tunis) came first to help the Phoenicians against a threat from the Tartessians (sixth century B.C.) but in the end they displaced the Phoenicians and established their own colonial regime in Spain. The Carthaginians made the first attempt toward making Spain a unitary state, however, the Romans were the first people to dominate the entire peninsula (from the end of the second century B.C. to the end of the fifth century A.D.). During this long occupation, roads were built to link all the regions. Indeed, Roman

bridges, cathedrals, circuses and other types of monuments can still be found throughout the peninsula.

The spreading of Roman culture and the benefits of Pax Romana (Roman Peace) were to be interrupted by the peninsula's invasion of the Visigoths whose presence (from the sixth till the eighth century) was not particularly significant.

In the beginning of the eighth century (711), the Moslems came from northwestern Africa and invaded almost all the territory. Following this invasion, a terrible and long struggle was conducted by Christian forces for more than seven centuries. Both the Christians and the Moslems tried to establish independent kingdoms. The conspicuous Moslem presence left important remains, especially in the kingdoms of Granada and Cordoba. This Reconquista (Reconquest) struggle, characterized by alternate Moorish and Christian victories, only came to an end in 1492, when the Christians were able to expel the invaders. On this important date, Spain established, for the first time, its national unity, under Fernando of Aragon and Isabel of Castille -- Los Reyes Catolicos (The Catholic Kings).

Also in 1492, Spain launched its overseas adventure through the voyage of Columbus (Map 2), thus establishing a first link with the American continent. Spanish projection was extended to other continents to include an alliance with the Austrian Habsburgs (Map 3) under Charles V, actually




MAP 2: First Voyage of Christopher Columbus

Source: R. Altamira, A History of Spain, 1949, p. 279.

Charles I of Spain. In 1556, Charles split the empire by abdicating the crown of Spain in favor of his son Philip II, who also received the Kingdom of Naples, the Duchy of Milan, Flanders with the French Comte and Luxemburg. Philip II, the most Spanish of the Habsburg kings, also inherited the Portuguese crown, which remained under Spanish rule until 1640. But extremely bad days were to come. Philip II attempted the invasion of the British Isles with the Armada Invencible, the world's largest fleet, but that impressive naval force was defeated, in 1588, both by a terrible storm and the swifter, better armed English vessels. In 1640, the Portuguese rebelled against Philip IV's deputy in Lisbon and restored their independence, nominating John IV as the new king. In May 1643, the once invincible tercios¹ (thirds) were defeated at the battle of Rocroi (the Spaniards lost 21,000 men to the French 4,000) during the devastating 30-year war. This war ended in 1648 for most of the countries involved, but Spain went on fighting until the Peace of Pyrenees was signed with France in 1659. The peace did not last long and the war against France was to be reopened. Only in 1700, when the French Prince Philip of Anjou succeeded to the Spanish throne did it come to an end.

Beginning with the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the eighteenth century saw Spain involved in many conflicts, most of which produced an unfavorable outcome. The dawn of the nineteenth century was marked with the Napoleonic invasions of the Iberian Peninsula (Map 4), but



THE MAJOR LINES OF ATTACK AND COUNTERATTACK

MAP 4: Napoleonic Invasions of the Peninsula

Source: David G. Chandler, Atlas of Military Strategy, 1980, pp. 110-111.

the Portuguese and the Spaniards, with British help, were able to defeat the French. The victorious forces were under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesly, Duke of Wellington, who after ending the Peninsular War, inflicted the final blow to Napoleon's army at Waterloo (1815).

The Peninsular War (1807-1814) left Spain internally devastated. Invaded again by the French in 1823 (Duc d'Angouleme's hundred thousand "Sons of St. Louis"), Spain could offer little resistance and was soundly defeated. Spain was further weakened by the anti-colonial, revolutionary wars in South America (1821-24), which stripped it of most of its colonial empire. Thereafter, an extremely weakened Spain "decided that her best protection lay in leaving the game of power politics to the great powers"², and adopted a policy of isolationism. However, this isolationism was to be clumsily broken during the disastrous Spanish-American War in 1898, and the Moroccan affair in the beginning of this century. The political climate of the Spanish homeland was very unstable during the 19th century, with many changes of government and violent social tensions caused mainly by the new urban proletariat. The brief experience of the First Republic (1873-74) and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy (Alfonso XII, 1875), put a definitive end to the internal Carlist wars, but could not adequately cope with internal social unrest. The constitutional monarchy was the cloak for a parliamentary dictatorship, the Parliament "was only

a forum for oratory"³ and "political control was maintained in large measure by corruption and manipulation."⁴

To understand Spain and its political development in the 20th century we have to bear in mind that the army enjoyed a strong position which was legitimized under King Alfonso XIII when, in 1907:

...the army won an extraordinary concession through the passage of the Law of Jurisdictions, which gave military courts jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses against military officers and institutions. Significantly, the impetus to this surrender of the civil to the military authority was provided by a Barcelona newspaper cartoon that had offended the susceptibilities of the military.⁵

In 1909 social turmoil reached its peak with a general strike and an anticlerical insurgency in Catalonia. Even though Spain's neutrality in World War I increased exports and trades with the belligerents and caused an industrial surge, the domestic social crisis did not decrease. In 1917, the progressively larger influence of the army, through the newly formed juntas de defensa (committees of defense), imposed changes in the government and demanded a higher military budget.

In 1921, just when Alfonso XIII was making a strong effort in support of a true constitutional government under civilian control, the Riff rebellion broke out in Spanish Morocco (1921-26), which naturally increased the importance of the military. The war began disastrously for Spain, with a crushing defeat at Anual and the massacre of four-fifths

of a Spanish Army of some 20,000.⁶ Separatist movements developed in Catalonia and the Basque regions sharpened internal antagonisms setting the stage for General Primo de Rivera's military coup on September 13, 1923. During the seven years he ruled a temporary appeasement was achieved and the war with Morocco terminated. The military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera was based on oppression establishing military law throughout the country. But it collapsed in 1930 mainly for not having preserved the support of the army. The upsurge of the steadily growing republican movement and other opposing forces caused Alfonso XIII to resign, leaving the throne vacant in 1931.

The Second Spanish Republic was then established in a political vacuum. From the elections of June 1931 for the Cortes Constituentes (Parliament), a coalition of liberal Republican and Socialists emerged. Prime Minister Manuel Azaña headed this coalition until November 1933. Opposed by an active extreme left faction and rejected by a large majority of Catholics shocked by Azaña's anti-clerical legislation, the regime desintegrated in spite of some positive achievements. That same year, the November elections gave 41 percent of seats to the Rightist parties and only 21 percent to a divided Left. What happened then was the prelude of the civil war. Successive cabinets could not control the social turmoil and at the end of 1935 the center-right coalition broke down. Spanish society had become

highly politicized, showing a strong tendency toward polarization, by the eve of the February 16, 1936 national elections. This time, the Left had learned from its failures in 1933 and acted in a united manner, organizing a Popular Front prior to the elections. The Right, on the contrary, was not even able to present an electoral manifesto.

Azaña headed a cabinet composed exclusively of left Republicans and announced his intentions of carrying out the Popular Front program. The Socialist party chose the "Bolshevized" tendency (Largo Caballero), opposing a moderate one (Indalecio Prieto). The Communist party clearly gained increasing influence, and through the voice of Dolores Ibarruri, known as La Pasionaria (The Passionate), claimed as early as March 1:

We live in a revolutionary situation and cannot be delayed by legal obstacles, of which we have had too many since April 14 (1931). The people impose their own legality and on February 16 asked for the execution of their murderers. The Republic must satisfy the needs of the people. If it does not, the people will throw it out and impose their will.⁷

The Azaña administration was successively compelled to make more and more concessions to the Communists. General Ochoa, the commander of the army forces that had pacified the Asturias region, was arrested and the Falange Española (Fascist party) declared illegal with the consequent arrest of its leaders and many of its members.

Under the newly reorganized (March 1936) Institute of Agrarian Reform indiscriminate violence and arbitrary arrests also took place. Next the moderate president of the Republic, Alcala-Zamora was deposed and the leftist Azaña was elected on May 10 with the new cabinet of Quiroga. The situation deteriorated further with a wave of strikes, syndicalist disputes and increased violence. Calvo Sotelo, who was the most respected voice in the parliamentary opposition, was murdered on July 13 by a group of officers of the Republican security forces. That same day in the afternoon, the Communist party seized the initiative by presenting to the other Popular Front parties the following proposed legislation for submission to the Cortes (Parliament):

Article 1. All organizations of fascist or reactionary character, such as Falange Española, Renovacion Española, CEDA, Derecha Regional Valenciana, and those whose characteristics are related to these will be dissolved, and all properties of these organizations and their leaders will be confiscated...

Article 2. All peoples known for their fascist reactionary and anti-Republican activities will be jailed and prosecuted.

Article 3. The government will confiscate the newspapers El Dabate, Ya, Informaciones, ABC and all the reactionary press of the provinces.⁸

II. The Civil War (1936-39)

With the Spaniards deeply divided over social, political, and religious issues, the army rebelled against

the regime on July 18, 1936. The rebellion was to lead to a three-year Civil War throughout Spain. Initially the successful outcome of the military insurrection and its struggle against the Loyalist Republican forces was not viewed with optimism:

Of the seven major Spanish cities, five remained in Republican hands. The two most industrialized regions were also Republican. The gold reserves and most other financial assets were Republican. The air force and navy remained primarily Republican, as did the large, semi-militarized police forces. Finally, the army itself was by no means united behind the insurrection of some of its generals: more than half of the units stationed on the peninsula seemed to have remained on the Republican side.⁹

Two orders of reasons can explain the final pro-Nationalist forces outcome. The first reason was the internal struggle in the Republican camp fostered by duplicity of the Communists who created division among the Socialists, reduced the influence of the anarchosyndical unionists, and destroyed the Trotskyite tendencies. The Communist's bid for power considerably weakened the Republican forces. Secondly, the Nationalists, being able to find an unquestionable leader (facilitated by the early death of Franco's competitors Sanjurjo and Mola), enjoyed the support of most of the northern and north-central rural populations and had, as a decisive factor, the command of units deployed in Spanish Morocco, undoubtedly the best prepared and equipped troops.

External influences soon appeared in the conflict. In

early October 1936, the Soviet Union emerged as the main supplier of arms, and in November the International Brigades joined the Loyalists. On the Nationalist side, Germany and Italy aided initially in the transport of troops from Morocco and by the autumn of 1936 started their steady support with men and equipment.


This bloody war which divided Spain (Map 5), represented an immense loss to the country:

The Spanish Civil War exceeded in ferocity many wars between nations. The losses in lives from all causes, taking into account deaths from malnutrition in the republic as well as those shot after the War, must have been about 500,000 ...the cost of the War, including both internal and external expenditures, was named later by the nationalists at 30,000 million pesetas (\$9.375 million).¹⁰

III. Franco's Spain

Because of the devastation of Spain it was essential to remain neutral during World War II. As noted by Stanley G. Payne in his book "Franco's Spain", Salazar encouraged Franco toward that decision:

An important factor in encouraging neutrality was the regime's relationship with Salazar's Portuguese government, which had always been close. The neighbor dictatorship, not unlike Franco's in its structure, had supported the latter throughout the Civil War. In March 1939, the two Iberian regimes had signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression; and the independent, somewhat pro-British orientation of Salazar encouraged Franco's own sense of caution.¹¹



MAP 5: Division of Spain, February, 1939.

Source: Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 1977, p. 885.

Thus Franco, an ally of Germany, convinced Hitler that the Spanish people could not afford a military involvement abroad. Even so, a division of volunteers, the "Blue Division", was sent to fight together with the Germans in the invasion of the Soviet Union. Although Spain declared officially its neutrality, it is today accepted that Spanish positions clearly favored the Axis. We must remember that after the German victory over France, Franco chose a "non-belligerent" status, instead of the previously announced neutrality, and accepted a meeting with Hitler in October 1940. As the final victorious outcome started to shift to the Allies side, Spain found itself in a somewhat uncomfortable position. As a consequence it was not admitted as a member of the newly formed United Nations and was forced into inevitable isolation. Indeed, the United Nations became a suitable platform to attack Franco's regime. Accordingly, Spain was not included in the Marshall Plan, a movement for the rebuilding of Europe after World War II. So Franco, was left alone to rebuild his country.

Internally, while weakening the opposition, Franco created broad support to include forces like the monarchists, the church, the armed forces and, of course, the Falange (the only legal party). As early as 1947, he officially perpetuated his power by adding to the Law of Succession an article establishing himself as Chief of State for an indefinite period. The law was then approved by the Cortes

(Parliament) and by a referendum, with twelve million favorable votes out of thirteen million. But Europe and the West suspecting the legitimacy of the process did not accept Franco's regime as a genuine expression of the Spanish peoples' will, and in 1949 Spain was once again denied membership in NATO, or in the European Council, whose aim was the defense and strengthening of democracy and its ideals. In the meantime, Franco's search for international respectability had some success in Latin America; also, by not recognizing Israel, Franco succeeded in cultivating the Arab countries.

The western opposition to Franco's regime in the early fifties began to loosen due to the advance of communism, the cold war and the Korean crisis. In 1951, American, British, and French ambassadors returned to Madrid and in 1953 a concordat was signed with the Holy See. But the main movement to regain Spain for the Western family was advocated by the United States. In 1950, Washington, encouraged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assumed a more pragmatic attitude which led to the establishment of a military accord with Spain. The United States needed adequate support bases for the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and Spain obviously could offer an important contribution. So Franco succeeded in breaking his policy of isolation and, at the same time, received extremely useful economical and financial support from the United

States as a result of the bases agreement (1953). From that point on, the danger of a possible Western support for an internal rebellion against Franco's regime was no longer feared, and Spain could take effective steps toward a steady development of the country. According to Arnold Hottinger, some important factors stand for the quick and decisive development of Spain:¹²

- Economic liberalization after 1959 (when Spain returned to the convertibility of the peseta and industrialization aided by foreign investment and technology, which let its GNP to double in a single decade.

- Transformation of the existing Church-State relationship under the healthy and progressive changes introduced by the Second Vatican Council.

- Increment of close contacts with Europe, achieved through emigration and tourism, and opening to European ideas (new Press Law and lifting of preliminary censorship after 1966).

- Appearance of the comisiones obreras (unofficial parallel trade unions) after 1962 as a replacement of the vertical state-run unions.

This rapid evolution of Spanish society starting in the late 1950's and initially based on economic, rather than political factors, had in the end a much deeper impact which could not be controlled by the government:

What began as a program of economic reform that was to be accompanied at most by a modest degree

of political liberalization ended by transforming Spain so completely that full democratization had become almost inevitable by 1975. The 'cunning' of capitalism had brought about subtly and by peaceful means the destruction of the dictatorial regime that had sponsored it precisely to preserve itself and to avoid democracy.¹³

Dividing Franco's era in two parts, we can say that contrasting to the first period of immobility mainly concerned with reaching stability through the use of force, the second period, in the last 12-15 years, was marked by important social and economic achievements:

In addition to giving Spain nearly four decades of peace and stability, the Franco government, notably during its last dozen years, also used that tranquility to transform the economic and social life of the nation to a remarkable degree.¹⁴

IV. Spain After Franco

Franco, as early as 1969, appointed Juan Carlos, grandson of Alfonso XIII (1902-1931), as his successor. This would prove to be according to Stanley Payne, a misjudgement by Franco: "If he had made a major personal political mistake it was his choice of a successor."¹⁵ Bringing Juan Carlos to Spain in 1953, Franco planned to educate him in the values of the Franquism as opposed to the liberalism advocated by Don Juan (Juan Carlos' father and legitimate heir) who defended a parliamentary, West European-style monarchy for Spain. During Franco's lifetime, Juan Carlos played a discrete role, but after the dictator's

death on November 20, 1975, his father's ideals were to prevail. As a Spaniard of the younger generation, he made it clear that he would liberalize the regime toward a modern western democracy. However, he had to respect the constitution in which Franco had included a clause stating that the incumbent Prime Minister would not change automatically when a new Head of State took over. Therefore Juan Carlos was forced to maintain Prime Minister Arias Navarro. However, being extremely cautious, the king assured himself of the support of the military. He knew very well the important role of the Armed Forces that, according to the Fundamental Laws of Franco, are to "guarantee the unity and independence of the country, the integrity of her territory, national security, and the defense of the institutional system."¹⁶ This important constitutional role of the Spanish Armed Forces is unique among the NATO nations.

Juan Carlos' successful management of the military can be explained by his previous tactful experience with the senior commandants, by a certain degree of depoliticization of the military initiated in the last period of Franco's regime, and above all, by the then Prime Minister Carrero Blanco's assassination in December 1973. This spectacular murder by the Basque terrorist organization ETA - Euskadi Ta Askatazuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) which could have provided the rationale for the return of a repressive regime, but was on the contrary a spring that represented

the "first serious attempt to give legal form to the proto-democratization that had been unfolding extralegally."¹⁷

Arias Navarro, a weaker figure, succeeded Carrero Blanco as Prime Minister (1973-1976) and Juan Carlos, skillfully and without major difficulties, closed the gap between Spain and Western Europe. For Spain, Europeanization proved to be more important than Franquism without Franco. The steps initiated under Arias Navarro toward liberalization were to be followed by the crucial period during which Juan Carlos, having gained control of the Council of Realm, was able to appoint Adolfo Suarez as the new Prime Minister on July 3, 1976.

A prime minister whose appointment was initially regarded as retrogressive because he had been identified with the Francoist bureaucracy set out with great effectiveness and dispatch to destroy Franco's heritage; a nation with a long history of political extremism and ineptness appeared to be transformed into a model of enlightened political behavior.¹⁸

Perhaps the most important achievement of Suarez' government was the Political Reform Act (Law for Reform of the Cortes involving the replacing of the existing corporative Parliament by a bicameral one (a 350 member Congress of Deputies and a 207 member Senate), based on political parties and free elections. Proceeding with a program of institutional reforms, the King and Suarez legalized all legitimate political parties (to include the Communist party but excluding the left-wing terrorist groups), legalized

trade unions and restored full civil rights. Also, partisan elections were convoked allowing freedom of speech and assembly in the electoral campaign.

The outcome of these elections of June 15, 1977, (the first free parliamentary election in Spain since February 15, 1936) favored the moderate Right and Left. Suarez headed the victorious coalition UCD (Union of Democratic Center) gaining 34.7 percent (165 seats in the Congress and 106 seats in the Senate). The extreme Left and the extreme Right were badly beaten. The Eurocommunists of Carrillo scored a somewhat frustrating 9.2 percent, but the big surprise winner was the Socialist Workers' Party of Felipe Gonzalez, receiving 29.2 percent of the popular vote (118 seats in the Congress and 48 seats in the Senate).

In the elections of March 1, 1979, the results were not very different (UCD scored 34.9 percent and the Socialists 30.5 percent) and Suarez was reelected. However, his position within the governmental coalition was not stable.

Suarez was forced to relinquish both the office of Prime Minister and party leadership on January 19, 1981. The combination of a lack of a clear-cut ideology coupled with increasing criticism within his party led to his down fall.

In any case, it must be said that Suarez made a strong contribution to the democratic cause:

By the force of his personality and his deft maneuverability, he made considerable progress. Assisted by his friend and mentor, King Juan Carlos, Suarez had approached the task of democratizing Spain in a determined, effective and supple manner that reflected the profound pragmatism of Franco's regime in its last stage.¹⁹

The flight of Suarez momentarily appeased the struggle within UCD, electing Calvo Sotelo for Prime Minister. Calvo Sotelo was said to be a technocrat with liberal tendencies. He had hardly formed his cabinet when he was confronted with the abortive coup of Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina who, on February 23, 1981, headed a group of ultra-rightist army officers and civil guardsmen in a quixotic invasion of the Cortes (Spanish Parliament). According to Professor of Law George E. Glos, U. S. Library of Congress, the coup was initially scheduled for a later date:

The coup was actually attempted at an earlier date than originally planned in order to take advantage of the debate of investiture in the Congress of Deputies at which time the entire government would be present and could be held hostage -- which actually occurred.²⁰

This menace to Spain's young democracy posed once again the question of to what extent is the Army capable and willing to destabilize the democratic regime and weaken the civilian authority. It appears that the Armed Forces are being liberalized and are generally supporting Spain's democratic evolution.²¹

Terrorism is another and more frightening reality that tested the democratic process in Spain. The Basque

terrorist organization ETA has assassinated more than two hundred people since early 1979. Acting predominantly in the Basque region, it also conducts attacks elsewhere in Spain. On May 7, 1981, the attempt on the life of the head of the king's military household, General Valenzuela, in Madrid, was another vivid reminder of the sinister organization whose aims are not at all clear:

Although nominally a Basque organization, the ETA, as a Marxist-Leninist front, draws its support from the international Communist movement and is directed from abroad. Its apparent objective of independence for the Basque country being obviously unrealizable, it would appear that its frequent violent acts of terrorism, including assassinations, are pursuing a different end, namely the setting up of a Marxist regime in Spain.²²

Besides the problem of violence, Calvo Sotelo had other serious difficulties to deal with: economic crisis, unemployment figures rounding 14 percent and an inflation rate of 16 percent by the end of 1981. Also, an increasingly stronger political opposition caused divisions in Calvo Sotelo's coalition. This became evident in June 1981, when the Divorce Law was voted in the Congress, and some UCD members aligned with the Socialist Workers' Party and the Communist Party. It was then quite clear that Sotelo's control over his party faced an imminent disintegration. Public opinion began to swing to Felipe Gonzalez, the leader of the Socialist Workers' Party as a real alternative. Speaking in the Congress on March 2, 1981, he made a formal offer of a coalition but Sotelo refused it, which was, perhaps an error of historical proportions. But even after the

rejection of their proposal for a grand coalition, the Socialists did not hurry to overthrow the government because:

They feared the collapse of the beleaguered government, which would create a vacuum that could invite military intervention. 'My job is to insure that the executive power - although it is not ours - is strong enough to defend itself from the attacks of democracy's enemies,' Gonzalez told me.

The Socialists expect to win the elections to be held in 1983, but until then they want the present government to survive. ²³

The continuing difficulties of the government through the rest of 1981 and 1982 led to the calling of early elections on October 28, 1982, which, as expected, were won by the Socialist Party. As a consequence, in December 1982, King Juan Carlos appointed Gonzalez Prime Minister of Spain. Doing so, he was exactly fulfilling the promise he had made in his speech to the U.S. Congress on June 2, 1976:

The monarchy will ensure, under the principles of democracy...the orderly access to power of distinct political alternatives, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people.²⁴

Felipe Gonzalez has now to demonstrate his skills and the validity of the Socialist proposal. With a clear-cut victory in the polls (202 of the 350 parliamentary seats), he enjoys a country-wide support from the voters who accepted his campaign appeal for El Cambio (A Change):

His campaign message was to vote for "The Change", what he meant by this was that since the death of Franco in 1975, power had remained fundamentally in the hands of the heirs of the former regime --

albeit in democratic clothing. To consolidate democracy required a hand-over of power to an alternate system of government, he argued.²⁵

The change actually took place but the expected accomplishment of the promises is not going to be a simple task. Important domestic problems have to be energetically addressed. Among them the regional autonomy demands, especially in Catalonia and the Basque country, and the threat of terrorism are critical issues to be taken into account by Felipe Gonzalez.

The inherited economic situation after a five-year recession period (since 1978) is perhaps the most important difficulty and a major challenge for the new government. The crisis reflects an inflation averaging 15 percent and an unemployment rate of 16 percent -- 2 million Spaniards without a job! Although the new Socialist government did not speak of large-scale nationalizations like those carried out in Portugal, it may have to intervene in the private sector in order to compensate the recent liberalization of the economy. This liberalization had been explained by the previous government as a preparation for entry into the Common Market. The new Socialist government still considers Community accession as a priority, but doesn't accept an earlier membership at the expense of national interests. In this regard the government is still not convinced that Spanish forces should be integrated into the NATO military structure. Ostensibly Gonzalez prefers not to be tied to

either military blocks and, at the same time, he wishes to tighten the traditional links with Arab and Latin American peoples. Thus, the Socialists argue Spain can better defend its own interests while accruing benefits for the West.

The Socialists, enjoying an ample majority, want to establish and follow a global and coherent policy based on more than a four-year term timeframe. An obvious precondition to implement the Socialist plans is to preserve Spain's democracy. The Socialists will have to gain and retain the confidence of the Armed Forces. As Robert Graham, the Madrid correspondent for the "Financial Times" puts it, "González will have to keep a wary eye on the military."²⁶ The abortive military coup (February 1981) is still very present, and if the transition to a full democracy can already be considered an achievement, the final goal is a Spain's democracy secured for the future.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 2

1. "Tercio" - standardized by 1534 a "Tercio" consisted of 12 companies (Six of pikemen, four of swordsmen and two of arquebusiers). Each company had about 250 men.
2. Arthur P. Witaker, Spain and Defense of the West (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1961), p. 93.
3. Gabriel Jackson, "The Azaña Regime in Perspective (Spain, 1931-1933)", in Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain, ed. Stanley G. Payne (New York: Modern Scholarship on European History, 1976), p. 75.
4. Stanley G. Payne, Franco's Spain (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), p. XII.
5. Arthur P. Witaker, op. cit., p. 106.
6. Ibid., p. 325.
7. Stanley G. Payne, "The Ominous Spring of 1936", in Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain, p. 124.
8. Ibid., p. 142.
9. Edward E. Malefakis, "International Political Problems and Loyalties: The Republican Side in the Spanish Civil War", in Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain, p. 151.
10. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 926-927.
11. Stanley G. Payne, op. cit., p. 27
12. Arnold Hottinger, "Spain One Year After Franco", The World Today, December 1976, p. 442.
13. Edward E. Malefakis, "Spain and Its Francoist Heritage", in From Dictatorship to Democracy - Coping with the Legacies and Totalitarianism, ed. John H. Hertz (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 217.
14. Manuel F. Iribarne and Charles A. Cerami, "Evolution in

Spain: The Meaning for Europe", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1977, p. 87.

15. Stanley G. Payne, "The Political Transformation of Spain", Current History, November 1977, p. 165.

16. Stanley Meisler, "Spain's New Democracy", Foreign Affairs, October, 1977, p. 200.

17. Edward E. Malefakis, op. cit., p. 224.

18. Ibid., p. 226.

19 Meyer Serfaty, "Spanish Democracy: The End of the Transition", Current History, May 1981, p. 215.

20. George E. Glos, "Danger Signals for Spain", The World Today, January 1982, p. 28

21. The principals involved in the February 1981 coup were severely punished. A panel of 17 military judges, on June 3, 1982, sentenced COL Tejero Molina and LT Gen. Milans del Bosh to 30 years in prison, which is the maximum permissible under Spanish law. Twenty other officers were given sentences of 6 years or less, the sole civilian defendant received a two-year sentence, and ten junior officers were acquitted. Facts On File, June 4, 1982, p. 408.

22. George E. Glos, op. cit., p. 27.

23. Lucy Komisar, "Spain's Fragile Democracy", The Nation, October 31, 1981, p. 441.

24. Stanley Meisler, op. cit., p. 190

25. Robert Graham, "Spain - 'El Cambio' and Its Implications to the Common Market", Europe, January - February, 1983, p. 12.

26. Ibid., p. 14.

CHAPTER 3

PORTUGAL'S YOUNG DEMOCRACY


I. A New Iberian Kingdom


Portugal was established as an independent kingdom by the middle of the twelfth century. To accomplish that a continuous struggle was conducted by the Portuguese kings against the powerful Kingdom of Castille. The struggle against the Moors was another constant in the first century of its existence, but in 1249 Portugal had already established, with some minor differences, its present continental borders (Map 6). In fact,

The new Kingdom was to become remarkable for its territorial stability, as well as other attributes. Indeed, Portugal possesses the world's most settled continental frontier, its boundaries having remained practically unchanged since the second half of the thirteenth century.¹

II. Overseas Expansion

After consolidating its domestic frontier, Portugal began an expansion beyond the continental area. This started with King John I, who, together with his sons Duarte (the heir), Pedro (Duke of Coimbra) and Henry "The Navigator", prepared expeditions to conquer positions in Morocco. Ceuta was captured in 1415 (Map 7) and from then on, as depicted





MAP 7: Portuguese King John I Takes Ceuta (1415).

Source: Colin McEvedy, Atlas of African History, 1980, p. 67.


on Map 8, the Portuguese navigators made longer and longer expeditions contouring the whole African coast.

In the meantime, while becoming familiar with the Western African coast they also learned how to sail the open sea, discovering and taking possession of the archipelagos of Madeira (1420) and Azores (1427). These islands were not effectively occupied until the early 1440's after a royal charter authorized Prince Henry to start the settlement.

However, the overseas expansion would raise new problems with the neighbouring Kingdom of Castille because the navigators of both countries very often disputed the primacy over the newly discovered lands and the regions to be explored. An agreement was finally reached by 1479 (Treaty of Alcáçovas) but the quarrel only ended through a Papal intervention (Bull of 1493) which led the countries to sign the definitive Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Through it, the non-Christian world was divided into two hemispheres, one for Portugal and the other for Castille. The dividing line was a meridian passing 370 leagues (1,184 miles) west of Cape Verde Islands, being the east part for Portugal and the west one for Castille (Map 9).

At this time Portugal was ruled perhaps by its greatest king, John II (1481-1495), who even as a prince was already involved in the overseas expansion planning:

In 1474 young Prince John (the future John II) was put in charge of overseas expansion. To him,



MAP 8: Portuguese Discoveries

Source: Area Handbook for Portugal, 1977, p. 32.

rather than Prince Henry or anyone else, the creation of a comprehensive plan of discovery, with its means and goals, should be credited. He or his advisers, conceived the project of reaching Asia (present-day India) by sea and subordinated every effort to it...²

King John II sent Bartolomeu Dias on an expedition to discover the sea route to India but he had to return after contouring Cabo da Boa Esperança (Cape of Good Hope) in 1488. The task would be completed during the reign of John II's successor, his brother-in-law, the fortunate Manuel I, who sent Vasco da Gama on the successful expedition of 1497. Gama's fleet reached India in May 1498 (Map 8).

King Manuel I was also to receive excellent news from the next expedition commanded by Pedro Alvares Cabral in 1500. Following the same route as before, but sailing more southwestward, he discovered Brazil, thus adding a new territory to the Portuguese Crown (Map 8).

As a result of these discoveries, Portugal progressively transformed itself into a country of trade and traders. Unfortunately, instead of stimulating its own domestic production or industrialization, Portugal relied mainly on the colonial contribution of sugar, precious woods, gold, coffee, cotton and diamonds commerce. By the middle of the sixteenth century, King Sebastian (1557-1578) died very young, without a direct successor. His uncle, Cardinal Henrique ruled for two years and upon his death in 1580, the legitimate heir was Philip II of Spain who was grandson of

the Portuguese King Manuel I. This resulted in Portugal being annexed by Spain for sixty years, until 1640, when Portugal found an opportunity to break the foreign yoke with King John IV. Only the Portuguese city of Ceuta was not regained, and has remained under Spanish control to this day.

After 1600, Brazil became the primary element of the Portuguese empire because its riches provided Portugal with a prosperity that was respected all over Europe. In 1822, due to the impact of the American Revolution, the rise of new political ideologies, the revolutionary events in Portugal (1820), and the pressure from the English, Brazil became independent under its first emperor Pedro I, son of the Portuguese King John VI.

With the loss of Brazil as a colony, Portugal realized the importance of maintaining sovereignty over the remaining colonies, particularly the African possessions of Angola and Mozambique. As such, after 1832, Portugal started a more effective policy of occupation, eastward from Angola and westward from Mozambique, thus providing long overdue support to these two huge overseas territories (besides the smaller Guinea-Bissao, Cape Verde and S. Tomé e Prince Islands, Macao, Timor and some tiny possessions in India).

III. The First Republic and Salazar's Period

In the beginning of the twentieth century a

republican revolution broke out in Portugal and its First Republic (1910-1926) sought for a program of full development of the colonies, following the example of other European colonial powers - England, France, Belgium and Holland. However, this First Republic was characterized by a strong and continuous political struggle among the various Republican factions. From the first president, Teófilo Braga (1910-1911) to the last, Bernardino Machado (1926), the First Republic counted nine presidents. During this period, political upheaval and economic and social problems contributed to a general situation of instability, uncontrolled inflation, frequent rioting, and almost complete anarchy. From this situation emerged the 1926 coup, headed by a right-wing military junta. But after two years, the governing junta had not succeeded in achieving a sound financial situation. It had to turn to a young eminent professor of economics, António de Oliveira Salazar. Salazar had briefly been the finance minister in the military government of 1926 but had resigned when the generals refused to give him a free hand. This time (April 1928), Salazar received the requested power to exercise complete financial control upon all the other ministries. He presented, for the first time in fifteen years, a budget envisaging a surplus, for the fiscal year of 1928-29. Although he was the Minister of Finance he began addressing the nation's other problems while consolidating his control of the government. After four years

(1932), President Carmona invited him to form a new government. As early as 1925, when he published the book "O Bolchevismo e a Sociedade" (Bolshevism and Society) he was already the leader of the Portuguese Right, but, as Prime Minister, he became the leader of the nation for a period which was to span forty years.

In 1933 he presented a new constitution, defining the state as unitary and corporative. Following an integralist doctrine, Salazar rejected class struggle as inevitable and considered it opposed to the principles of the "New State." He believed in a strong state and a strong executive to support a solid, prudent and conciliatory nationalism, well expressed in his famous maxim: "Nothing against the Nation, all for the Nation." He also emphasized the role of the family. There was no attempt to reunite church and state although Father Cerejeira, later the Cardinal Chief of the Portuguese Catholic Church, was his admirer and an intimate friend. Salazar's public opinions about religious beliefs were generally moderate and tolerant. For more than two decades, his policies were relatively successful. He achieved financial equilibrium and the gold reserves reached a high level. Following the Second World War, during which he kept Portugal as a neutral country, some prosperity was enjoyed. He also established a firm and wise foreign policy:

What should be emphasized - and that to Salazar's credit - is that a new foreign policy for Portugal

was in the making. While never rejecting the traditional alliance with England, the New State tried a more independent nationalist tack which accounted for Portugal's political sympathies.

In spite of a number of important changes and achievements, the "New State" was not able to transform Portugal into a truly developed country. Moreover, Salazar's New State gradually began to show distinct anti-democratic characteristics, using repressive mechanisms such as:

- Censorship of periodicals, radio, cinema, theatre.
- Prohibition of strikes.
- Creation of political police.
- Prohibition of political party activities.

A dictatorship undoubtedly took form. However, the Western allies, mainly because of strategic importance of the Azores, accepted Portugal as a founder member of NATO (1949).

At home Salazar's regime faced increasingly stronger opposition: by Humberto Delgado, a candidate to the presidential elections in 1958, by political exiles who captured the liner Santa Maria in 1961, by the Minister of Defense, General Botelho Moniz who attempted a "coup d'etat" in April 1961, and by a military uprising in Beja on the first day of 1962.

The main issue and perhaps the main failure of Salazar's regime, was related to the colonies. Salazar considered the colonies as overseas territories, being

integral parts of a multi-continental Portugal. For this reason, when the colonial guerrilla war started in the early 60's Salazar ordered the Armed Forces to defend Angola, Guinea and Mozambique. Many people, either inside or outside Portugal, anticipated the end of Portuguese colonialism. Nevertheless, Salazar stubbornly kept the nation fighting this hopeless and debilitating war, where Portugal had much to lose and nothing to gain, if a political solution could not be found soon. By 1968, when Salazar finally fell from power (literally falling from his chair and being disabled till his death, two years later), more than 100,000 Portuguese troops were fighting in three theatres of operations - Angola, Mozambique and Guinea.

IV. The 1974 Revolution and the Democratic Regime

In September 1968, Marcelo Caetano was appointed Prime Minister. There was a general fear of a leftist push or an ultra-right attempt to seize power. So Caetano's policy had to be extremely cautious. He liberalized some aspects of the regime, but the reforms were very superficial. Facing a crisis in agriculture, depending on the immigrants' remittances, tourism, and colonial revenues to reduce the debts of the balance of payments, the recession period of 1973 caught Caetano in a critical situation. The oil embargo by the Arabs following the Yom Kippur War was

protracted in the case of Portugal because the use of Azores base was authorized for the American resupply of Israel. Meanwhile, all those who expected that Caetano would be able to end the war in Africa were completely disappointed. On the contrary, the sustainment of campaigns in Angola, Mozambique and especially Guinea (Bissao) consumed the astonishing strength of about 200,000 men by 1974. The professional officers corps was short and exhausted by successive assignments in the dangerous overseas theatres of operations. A generalized dissatisfaction was reigning among the captains in particular:

The army officers who led the 1974 revolt, most of them young and all of them veterans of Portugal's unpopular thirteen-years-long colonial wars in Africa acted from varied motives. The frustrations of fighting endlessly and inconclusively against African rebels, dissatisfaction over pay and promotion, discontent with the economic backwardness of their country, its high rate of illiteracy, the social inequities and the political rigidity of Portugal's rulers - all seemed to play a part in the organization of the officers' movement that finally overthrew the Caetano regime.⁴

The 25th of April 1974 was not at all unexpected. Many reasons can be ascertained:

- In the long term, the Portuguese were tired of the 36 year long Salazar dictatorship, followed by the 6-year Caetano regime without significant changes.

- In the medium term, the 13-year war in Africa had exhausted the country and no political solution could be devised.

- In the short term, the students' unrest, the army reaction through the Armed Forces Movement and the public position of General Spínola in his book "Portugal and the Future" (February 1974) where he criticized the government's economic, social, political, military and diplomatic policies. To these domestic problems we must add the declared situation of international isolationism. There were constant condemnations by the United Nations regarding the Portuguese policy in Africa. A quarrel with the Vatican took place in 1970, when Pope Paul VI met the three leaders of the liberation movements fighting Portugal in its African territories. Finally, the demonstration at the Portuguese embassy in London, when Caetano visited England in 1973, completes the dramatic situation of the Portuguese regime in the Spring of 1974.

Like almost all Portuguese revolutions, this was one without bloodshed. There was no resistance at all. Premier Marcelo and President Thomaz were arrested. A "Junta of National Salvation" (3 army generals, 2 airforce generals, and 2 admirals) headed by the former Deputy General Staff Chief, General Spínola, appeared that night on television and read a proclamation to the Portuguese (See Annex A).

The new junta dismantled the old regime structures through a series of decrees. Political parties were authorized and the well known Socialist leader Mário Soares and the Communist leader Alvaro Cunhal returned to Portugal

from exile.

From all the turmoil that followed the revolution, the Portuguese Communist party emerged as the strongest and the most organized force, now openly active after almost 50 years of underground existence. In less than a fortnight, they installed hundreds of cells, occupying, whenever possible, the buildings of extinct institutions related to the old regime. In their frantic search for power, the Communists and their sympathizers, most of them opportunists, seized control of the press, radio, television, and various public and even private enterprises.

General Spínola was proclaimed provisional President of the Portuguese Republic on May 15, 1974. He appointed a lawyer, Palma Carlos, as Prime Minister. The cabinet consisted of the most important political forces, including the Socialist party leader Mário Soares as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communist party leader Cunhal as a minister without portfolio.

Spínola and Palma Carlos soon learned that they were to face a leftist led opposition instigating constant strikes, all kinds of labor problems and further social unrest. Spínola was also very concerned with the overseas territories, as all the liberation movements leaders of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea immediately rejected the proposed federative system of alliance with Portugal. Internal Communist (pro-Soviet oriented) pressure and international Communism combined

their efforts toward an immediate and complete independence:

The Soviet government newspaper Izvestia charged, May 6, that important civilian and military elements in Portugal sought to 'castrate' demands for radical reforms. It said, the new Portuguese regime would have to accept complete independence for Portugal's overseas territories. Chinese Premier Chou En Lai declared, May 6, that the Portuguese coup 'signals the ignominious failure of Portugal's notorious policy of colonialism and represents a major victory for the persistent and protracted armed struggle of the African people.'⁵

In July 1974, Palma Carlos, lacking enough power to rule the country, resigned and Spínola had to accept leftist COL Vasco Gonçalves as Prime Minister, who formed the second provisional government on July 17. Spínola himself had to resign by the end of September as he was not able to deal with the continuous pressure by the Leftist forces. He was replaced on September 20, by General Costa Gomes who had the support of the "Coordinating Committee" of the Armed Forces Movement, from where Gonçalves had come, and which was showing an increasing Leftist influence.

On March 11, 1975, another crisis occurred in Lisbon. The causes and conditions surrounding it were not clear and still now Left and Right accuse each other:

It was the result of complex, subterranean maneuvering engaged in by both sides for months. General Spínola was tricked into believing that an anti-communist putsch might succeed. When he arrived at the Tancos air base in central Portugal, he found a shambles. He barely had time to board a helicopter and flee across the border to Spain.⁶

Spínola (who fled to Spain and then to Brazil) and his conservative followers were accused of being the instigators.

This revolt was quickly suppressed by Gonçalves supporters. President Costa Gomes and Premier Gonçalves denounced the rebels as "reactionaries". That very evening the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) summoned its 200 member assembly and after spending the entire night in lengthy consultation, they advocated a series of extreme resolutions, including the expelling of General Spínola from the army, the creation of a Council of the Revolution with special powers to assure the success of the revolution, and the establishment of the Armed Forces Movement as a legitimately organized institution. Nationalization of the banks was also decided as an anti-monopolistic action.

Gonçalves announced a new cabinet on March 26, 1975 in which the Communists were the most important force. The then U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger declared:

...the Armed Forces Movement, which is substantially dominated by officers of leftist tendencies, has now appointed a new cabinet in which communists and parties closely associated with the communists have many of the chief portfolios.

This will of course raise questions for the United States in relation to its NATO policy and to its policy toward Portugal.

The situation in Portugal should not be seen solely in domestic terms. Geopolitically, it belongs to the West, and this leftward drift of the Portuguese government was dangerous to Western powers and to the U.S.:

U.S. strategic and political interests are significantly involved in Portuguese crisis. Not only might a radical turn in Portugal deprive the United States of its air base and naval station in the

Portuguese Azores, but, as perceived from the beginning in Washington, a marked leftward shift in Lisbon would dangerously upset the balance of power in Europe. The United States and a number of NATO governments thus take the view that a real change in the status quo in Portugal is intolerable.⁸

On April 25, 1975, just one year after the revolution, the first free elections in the last 50 years took place. In spite of the recent Communist uprising, the results were 72.5 percent for the non-communist parties (Socialists 247 seats, Social-democrats 80 seats, conservative Social Democratic Center 16 seats), while the Communist party had 12.5 percent (30 seats). After this somewhat frustrating result, the Communist leaders rushed to explain that elections were not at all important. Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves declared immediately that electoral results would not change the composition of his cabinet. So, Communist forces continued to strengthen their positions and seized almost complete control of radio, television and press. The few non-communist ministers of Gonçalves's cabinet resigned in July and a firm opposition was initiated, joining all non-communist forces.

In August 1975, Gonçalves formed his last and most radical cabinet. President Costa Gomes was pressed to dismiss Gonçalves, not only by Socialists and Social Democrats, but also by the moderate elements of the Armed Forces who increasingly opposed an attempt of a radical minority to impose a dictatorship following eastern European communist

models.

By the end of the Summer 1975, anti-communist riots started to occur mainly in the north and in the Azores. It was with some reluctance that the ambiguous President Costa Gomes finally removed Gonçalves:

The leftward slide of the Portuguese revolution was arrested on August 29, 1975, when chameleon-like President Francisco da Costa Gomes was forced to fire Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves, who, working with the Communists and their allies, had already taken over the Socialist newspaper 'Republic' together with 'Renascença', the Catholic radio station, and was moving the country ever leftward.⁹

For the sixth provisional government, Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, who had served in the original Junta of National Salvation, headed a broadly based cabinet with military officers, Socialists, Social-democrats and one Communist. However, the Communists did not accept such a sudden reduction of their influence and fostered a resurgence of political and social disturbances culminating in November 25, 1975, with a military coup, which was crushed. This important victory of moderate and democratic forces was the decisive blow that prevented the communists from seizing power in Portugal. It also proved according to Tad Szulc that, "Kissinger's visceral pessimism notwithstanding, it is possible for the Communist Party to lose a contest for power when democratic forces retain their capacity to react."¹⁰

From the November 25, 1975 events emerged the figure

of Ramalho Eanes, shortly afterwards appointed Army Chief. On June 27, 1975, he received a mandate from the people by being elected President. Eanes was also re-elected five years later in 1981.

The elections for the Assembleia da República (Parliament) in April 1976, for a four year period, gave the Socialists 107 seats, the Social Democrats 73 seats, the Centrists (Social Democratic Center) 42 seats, the Communists 40 seats and one seat to the leftist Popular Democratic Union (UDP). According to these results, on July 15, the Socialist leader Mário Soares formed the first consitutional, although minority Socialist government. Two years after the revolution this was at last the beginning of democracy in Portugal. Two different types of lessons had then been learned:

Portugal's democratic regime inaugurated in 1976 thus possessed a dual heritage. It inherited the consequences of half a century of right-wing authoritarianism, but no less important was the recent experience with left-wing triumphalism.¹¹

As a moderate, Soares had to face attacks from the Communists and from the Right. To survive, in the absence of a majority, he used the strategy of shifting coalitions, which proved not to be a reliable technique. After ruling 500 days, he was defeated on a no-confidence motion. President Eanes asked Soares to try again. This time he made a strange coalition accepting three Center Democrats in his cabinet. This second constitutional government was of short duration because Soares, while accepting the votes of the

Center Democrats to assure a majority in the Parliament, largely ignored them in the policy making. The end came on July 27, 1978, opening the doors to three successive governments of Eanes' initiative until an interim election was called on December 1979. This election gave the victory to the Democratic Alliance (Social Democrats, Centrists and Monarchists). The 1980 parliamentary elections confirmed the Democratic Alliance victory of 1979, this time winning 136 of the 250 seats, which conferred on them an absolute majority. However, the Democratic Alliance would unfortunately lose its charismatic leader, the Prime Minister Francisco Sá Carneiro who was killed in an airplane accident on December 4, 1980. His death initiated the beginning of the Democratic Alliance's decline.

V. Portugal Rejoins Europe

Portugal in 1974, began after 45 years of totalitarianism, the process of developing a democratic government. At the same time, Portugal finally ended its long colonial wars and began to seek its rightful place among the western European countries. To consolidate its new democracy, a full integration and participation in European organizations was a foregone conclusion. On September 22, 1976, the Council of Europe accepted Portugal as its nineteenth member. The access and full integration in the Common Market has followed

a long process of negotiations since the intention to join the E.E.C. was first announced in 1976 by Soares' government. Considering membership an important step to shore up Portugal's democracy and develop the country, he successfully sought for the support of his western European counterparts:

Most western governments share the view that, unless Portugal is saved from economic and financial collapse, there will be a grave danger that the country's fragile democracy may be swept away by extremist forces from either right or left. For his part, Soares believes that, given sufficient breathing space a combination of austerity and the prospect of EC membership will pull the country back onto its feet.¹²

However, Portugal's entry is being considered, despite Portuguese objections, simultaneously with Spain which may cause further delays, a situation that does not contribute to the desired stability:

The European Parliament has on several occasions pointed out the dangers of continuing delay in negotiations, and has more than once shown itself to be in favor of accession.

The European summit in Copenhagen once again stressed the political validity of the enlargement process.¹³

Prime Minister Balsemão announced that he expects the negotiations to be finally concluded this year with an effective entry in January, 1984.

Portugal's economic situation, about nine years after the revolution, is far from healthy. Ideological upheaval and social unrest have caused a situation of continuous crisis. As a Cabinet Minister of Prime Minister Balsemão

put it, "it's not really a crisis, it's something worse. It's a sort of marsh, where nothing moves."¹⁴ By the end of 1982, the balance-of-payments was expected to show a deficit as high as \$3.5 billion. With an estimated inflation rate of 24 percent for the same period, and despite the still fairly reasonable level of reserves in gold (\$8 billion), the \$12 billion foreign debts, with payments starting this year (1983), represent a burden too high to be paid by the Portuguese whose incomes per capita (about \$2,000 a year) is one of the poorest in western Europe.¹⁵ The 1976 Constitution proved to be too restrictive by explicitly committing Portugal to Socialism and a collectivization of the means of production. Many politicians also resented the role of the military who ruled immediately after the coup and its legacy, the Council of Revolution:

At the margin of politics is the military, segments of which toppled the dictatorship and ran the country for 28 months thereafter. The Armed Forces in Portugal have a more important formal position than in any other West European nation; the 1976 Constitution gives their Revolutionary Council the right to 'review' or veto actions taken by the National Assembly.¹⁶

The non-elected Council of Revolution used, in effect, its veto against the majority ruling coalition namely about the governmental proposes to develop private sector industries and banks. Only in October 1982, the 1976 Constitution was finally revised and the Council of Revolution disbanded with the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority.

If the Council of Revolution represented the last remnants of military influence on the policy lasting until late 1982, the majority of the Armed Forces had for some time been critically examining their own internal problems. Equipment modernization and army restructuring were absolutely necessary! As a result of the end of the colonial wars, the army was abruptly reduced from over 200,000 in 1974 to under 40,000 in 1980. A greater participation in NATO has been accomplished and through Bonn and Washington, new equipment has been received. Portuguese military extensive experience in Africa had now to be adapted to a new role in the defense of Western Europe. For this purpose, an airborne brigade has been raised. The Brigade, currently earmarked to be employed in the southern flank of NATO can however, be deployed to anywhere in western Europe with little prior notification. The professionalism and operational value of the Portuguese army, "West Europe's only force with extensive battlefield experience"¹⁷, was recently (December 82) once more recognized when the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs officially invited Portugal to join the International Peace Force stationed in Lebanon.

VI. The African Tie

The Portuguese 1974 revolution, gave birth to the following independent Portuguese speaking countries:

Republic of Guinea - Bissao in September 1974; People's Republic of Mozambique in June 1975; Cape Verde Republic in July 1975; Democratic Republic of S. Tomé e Príncipe in July 1975; People's Republic of Angola in November 1975.

The relations with former colonies are considered important and have received special attention by all governments. Portuguese cultural influence for five centuries within these countries is still very significant. State visits have been conducted and ties with those new countries are now stronger. The relations with Mozambique, while initially tenuous, were definitely improved in 1982, with the visits of the Prime Minister in June 1982 and the President in November of the same year. It has already been announced that the President of Mozambique, Samora Machel, will visit Portugal. As Richard Timsar reported to "The Christian Science Monitor" on November 17, 1982:

A formal defense treaty Mozambique hopes to sign next year will turn Lisbon's former East African colony into the single biggest client of Portugal's budding military industry, but arms exports are not its most important sector.¹⁸

Portugal's efforts to rejoin Europe have essentially been a success since their beginning in 1974. Lisbon is also making a concerted attempt to tighten its historically close relations with the third world -- particularly in Africa, where a steady rapprochement with its former colonies is now a fact. Portugal is thus most qualified to act as the "honest broker" in future mediations between Europe and those new developing nations.

CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4
GEOSTRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
IBERIAN PENINSULA

I. Continental Area

The Iberian Peninsula lies in the southwest of Europe, bounded to the north by the Cantabrian Sea (Bay of Biscay) and the natural barrier of the Pyrenees mountains, which forms the Spanish-French border; to the east by the Mediterranean; to the south by the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; to the west by the Atlantic (Map 1). It is a distinct geographic unit, perfectly identified, and essentially separated from the rest of Europe.

Iberia is considered a "critical intersection of strategic fault lines running both north to south and east to west."¹ Spain, which occupies most of the peninsula (roughly five sixths) is the second most mountainous country in Europe and second in size to France. The extreme southern part, Gibraltar, a British possession, is a vitally important choke point controlling the western Mediterranean gate.

The Iberian Peninsula, outflanks mainland Europe on the southwest and assumes a prominent position, which is well complemented by the symetric position of the British Isles to the north. The addition of Spain coupled with Portugal represents an important counterpart to the loss of

France from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. Manpower reinforcement and critical depth are also added to the European theatre of operations, so presenting a possible answer to the constant concerns of NATO planners. According to Stanley Payne, this enlargement of NATO assumes an "increasing importance as a potential peg on which to base one corner of a revamped system of collective security in western Europe."² Also, as Dennis Culkin states:

The Iberian Peninsula's geography makes both Spain and Portugal of potential strategic importance in two other capacities: as 'redouts' for NATO forces regrouping or retreating from a Warsaw Pact assault in the central region, and as bases of naval and naval-air operations, in the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic approaches.³

The geographical and topographical conditions of the peninsula along with its about 590,000 square kilometers adequately provide for the conduct of defensive operations. The defense in depth will be primarily facilitated by the use of the peninsular's airfields in support of NATO's central region. The base of Beja, in Alentejo -- the flat central-southern region of Portugal, is an excellent facility which normally enjoys clear weather. Its operational conditions have successfully been upgraded under a Portuguese-German program in past years. The air distances from eastern Europe to the central part of the peninsula fall beyond the 2,000 mile range, which can anticipate an identical or even more secure condition for air operations as compared to the

United Kingdom.⁴ Indeed, by dispersing NATO aircraft throughout the peninsula, their safety will be guaranteed by being out of range all but the long range Soviet bombers, whose action would be, in any case, strongly limited by NATO's missile and aircraft defenses positioned along the entire depth of the European theatre.⁵

The littoral configuration of the Iberian Peninsula allows access to either maritime or continental areas providing assurances of secure bases, and the possibility to protect supplies and in overwater reinforcement. The extremely long coastlines also have numerous safe ports to receive logistical materiel and manpower. The existing communications facilities, to include a NATO integrated Portuguese satellite ground terminal will permit orderly consolidation of logistics and deployment inland.

The Iberian Peninsula is a bastion in the rear of western Europe from where, in case of a disaster, the remaining NATO forces and reinforcements can be regrouped, and invaluable time can be gained for continued military operations within the European scenario.

II. Atlantic and Mediterranean Dimension


The Iberian Peninsula has a highly increased value in that it projects itself and western Europe toward two other continents.⁶ However, in spite of being contiguous, Portugal's

and Spain's geographic locations

...offer distinct, if related advantages. Spain overlooks the entrance to the Mediterranean and its western waters. On the other hand, Portugal and its island bases in the Azores are the key to NATO use of the Atlantic Ocean, and the potential of Spain as a real area.

The Atlantic dimension of Portugal is characterized by the Portuguese strategic triangle (Map 10), linking the mainland to the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira.

The first triangular vertex is the Portuguese mainland. The second one is the Azores archipelago whose exceptional location represents a very important and crucial point for NATO in general, and for the U.S. in particular. The Azores base of Lajes is positioned on the island of Terceira, approximately 850 miles from the Portuguese coast and 2,200 miles from the east coast of the U.S. At Lajes there is a support and refueling unit of the USAF Military Airlift Command (MAC). Its strategic value was demonstrated when the U.S. refueled the strategic C5A/Galaxy cargo aircraft carrying supplies to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In 1975, approximately 75 MAC aircraft per month transited through the base. Indeed, Lajes offers an excellent in-transit stopover point for transatlantic flights on an all-year, all-weather basis. The base also has an anti-submarine role, as aircraft from Lajes may perform reconnaissance and anti-submarine operations over a large area of the Atlantic beyond the reach of mainland-based



MAP 10: The Portuguese Strategic Triangle

Source: Map of Africa, sheet 502872 1-76 (Parcial)

aircraft. The Azores enjoys a unique strategic position because the bases in Spain, as well as in-flight tanker assets located at Saragoza, are too far from the United States to provide a viable alternative. Moreover, the Azores strategic location can also be seen as a "rear element", albeit, at a considerable depth, toward the access to the north Atlantic Greenland-Iceland-Norway gaps by the Soviet fleet stationed in Murmansk.

The third vertex of the Portuguese triangle is the archipelago of Madeira. Consisting of the islands of Madeira and Porto Santo, it occupies the southern most position of NATO and lies not far from the maritime routes in the south Atlantic towards Europe and/or the Mediterranean. In the Porto Santo NATO facility, there are important airfield (with runways 2,440m long) and 25,000m² aircraft parking area that can be easily enlarged. The base also has fuel reservoirs, some of them underground, with a total capacity of 5,000m³ of AVGAS and 3,000m³ of YP-4. It has housing for maritime patrol aircrafts (GMPA's) on a detachment temporary basis and can accomodate two hundred men.

The airfield in Funchal suffers from the technical limitation of its relative short runway and somewhat difficult air approach, but even so, it can complement the Porto Santo base. Funchal also has an important harbor which allows deep draught ships to coast along the quay and can supply any kind of fuel at a rate of 600 tons per hour. In the


exterior harbor all categories of ships can anchor, without any draught limitations. In a crisis, the Madeira archipelago may be exploited for the protection either of oil tankers coming from the Persian Gulf to Europe, or ships passing from the U.S. to the south of Europe and the Mediterranean.⁸

Both the U.S. and NATO recognize the highly strategic value of the Portuguese triangle. For that reason, Portugal is the only European country completely integrated in the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) through the former Iberian Atlantic (IBERLANT), now the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANTCOM) to whom the Island Commander Madeira (ISCOMADEIRA) reports (Chart #1). The Iberian Atlantic Command is now headed by a Portuguese admiral.

Spain also has much more to offer in strategic positions besides the already mentioned significance of its continental share of the Iberian Peninsula. First, like Greece, Italy and France, Spain has a Mediterranean dimension (Map 1). In this vast interior sea, which has always had strategic importance to western civilization, resides the main Spanish interest and it is here that Spain can greatly contribute to NATO and the development of a Mediterranean consciousness.

Directly east of Gibraltar we find the western portion of the Mediterranean -- the Alboran Sea, which Spain adequately controls through its southern coast positions, its

CHART 1 Allied Command Atlantic



* Currently, Cinescent holds direct
responsibility for this area
 - - - - - Co ordination and Planning
 - - - - - Maritime air chain of command
 - - - - - Operational Control

Source: NATO Facts and Figures, 1978, p. 224.

small islands of Penon de Velez, Alhucemas and Chafarinas, and the two cities it holds on the African coast: Ceuta (since the ~~six~~teenth century) and Mellila (since the fifteenth century). Spain continues its Mediterranean influence beyond the Alboran Sea through its eastern coast and the Balearic Islands whose strategic and logistical importance increases every day. Former Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe Command (AFSOUTH), U. S. Admiral Horacio Rivero, extolled the value of the Balearic Islands in prohibiting a potential Soviet presence from the more radical Arab states of North Africa, e.g., Algeria and, farther but more threatening, Libya. NATO bases in the Balearics or on the southern coast of Spain between Alicante and Gibraltar provide excellent locations for protecting the sea lanes of the western Mediterranean.⁹ The control of the west Mediterranean cannot rely only on the important but single position of the Gibraltar choke point. Considering the increased threat in this region, and according to the trends of the last decade,

...it is logical to assume that Soviet pressure for great Mediterranean influence will continue to grow. In order to resist it, NATO needs more than Gibraltar to control one end of that Sea. It needs a whole country for defense in depth. Spain wishes to be that country.¹⁰

Second, in addition to Spain's Mediterranean dimension the Canary Islands, located north of the Tropic of Cancer, provide Spain a privileged situation on the maritime routes

between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. These islands offer an excellent position from which to reinforce the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defense of lines of communication (LOC) in the south Atlantic and protect maritime traffic sailing from the Cape of Good Hope, e.g., oil tankers. Also, in case of war, it is estimated that ninety percent of logistical support to Italy, Greece, and Turkey must be provided by sea, generally from the U.S. which obviously must pass through Gibraltar, which enhances the protecting positions of the Madeira and Canary Islands. As a logistic support base to sustain an operational effort in Europe, the Canary Islands offer the possibility of handling 300,000 tons of materiel and 200,000 tons of fuel daily.

The situation of these archipelagos has an additional importance vis-a-vis the turbulent region of northwestern Africa. The control of this area, although not included in the NATO accords, is critical to the Alliance, since the existing tensions may have serious repercussions in the southwestern north Atlantic and western Mediterranean. This would no doubt affect western interests and would bring an increased vulnerability to NATO's southern flank.

In conclusion, it is quite evident that the two nations of the Iberian Peninsula coupled with their Atlantic island possessions are key elements as well as a reinforced opponent to the Soviet Union's consistent strategy of world conquest. Portugal and Spain's geostrategic position along

with their professional and dedicated Armed Forces and historical loyalty for the western cause are the very heart of NATO control of the western Mediterranean and eastern north Atlantic.

CHAPTER 4

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CHAPTER 5
SPAIN JOINS NATO

I. Spain's Adhesion

On the 30th of May 1982, Spain finally joined NATO. The road to accession was a long one and countless obstacles had to be overcome. Although the U.S. was long in favor of Spain's entrance into the Alliance, other countries like Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and England showed their traditional opposition. Their negative position was based on Spain's heritage -- General Franco's regime was not considered compatible with the preamble to the text of the North Atlantic Treaty:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.¹

With the death of Franco and the transition of Spain to a constitutional monarchy, the primary reason for the opposition of those countries ceased to exist. The new Spanish democratic government, initially with Adolfo Suarez and then with Calvo Sotelo evinced a political will to join

the Alliance. On December 2, 1981, Madrid presented its formal application to accession to NATO and at a ceremonial plenary held in Brussels on December 10, 1981, the 15 NATO Foreign Ministers signed a Protocol of Accession inviting Spain to become the 16th member of the Alliance. At home, Sotelo had to face the opposition of the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), then the strongest parliamentary party after his ruling coalition (UCD).

On May 29, 1982, the Protocol of Accession had been ratified by all member countries. Thus, the Secretary General invited Spain to join the Alliance. Depositing its instrument of accession with the government of the United States of America, as called for by article 10 of the treaty, Spain became NATO's 16th member on May 30, 1982.

After joining NATO, Spain was available to participate in the defense structure according to a formula and details to be settled. But all this process would experience a significant deadlock when the Socialists came to power at the end of the year. The Socialist's anti-NATO policy has **severely** hampered the full integration of Spain into the military structure.

The PSOE, from the beginning, has advocated for Spain a policy of nonalignment with either military block. Having come to power after Spain joined NATO, a nonmilitary integration rather than an immediate withdrawal became the most likely expected reaction:

During the recent election campaign, Felipe Gonzalez was questioned on his intentions regarding a referendum on the subject of NATO. He replied that his party's position had not changed but noted that the question was not being treated as a priority issue, meaning no doubt that Socialist Spain would not be seeking an immediate withdrawal from the alliance. The more likely move would appear to be for Spain to take a stand similar to that of France, withdrawing from NATO's military command structure without formally leaving the alliance.²

II. Advantages, Disadvantages, NATO Roles and Military Commands

Why did the previous Spanish government desire expeditious action on their application for membership in NATO?

First, we have to consider as a related issue, the Spanish negotiations to enter the European Economic Community (EEC). Spain applied for EEC membership in 1977, and the then ruling coalition UCD leadership believed that Spain's bargaining position would be improved as a member of NATO. Or, as Spain's Defense Minister Alberto Oliart Saussol put it:

NATO isn't merely a military entity as far as Spain is concerned, but also a very important political and economic entity for defending us better in any contingency which may arise. The fact of belonging to NATO binds us more closely to Europe, and that, I believe, matters to Spain, because Spain is, in fact, part of Europe.³

Two other advantages are also implied in his words:

an enhanced security under NATO umbrella and a stabilizing effect on its social-political life, strengthening the democratic regime and removing the danger of any possible recurrence of the years of Franco's dictatorship. This stabilizing effect is expected to have a beneficial impact on the armed forces, and on the army in particular. Under Franco's regime, the Spanish Army was used in a political role to protect Spain from the internal threat. Through NATO, those in the Army not yet reconciled with democracy, pluralism and a ruling socialist party could now find a new mission and identify a common external threat. A NATO mission would bring the military a greater responsibility and help it to overcome the lack of a deeply-rooted tradition of subordination to the civilian power. Moreover, the international contacts with officers from the other NATO countries would give them a new broad and reinforced democratic horizon, and consequently "membership in NATO would open windows on the world for officers who are now discontented with police duty at home."⁴ In his report to the 97th U.S. Congress, Senator Charles Percy, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, referred to the advantages for the Spanish military and the need for a new mission:

...those military officers receptive to NATO membership see such a step as making a positive contribution to the modernization and improvement of Spain's armed forces, and hopefully at a somewhat lesser cost in collaboration with NATO than if Spain attempted it on her own. In addition, proponents of

the Alliance maintain that membership would give the armed forces a clear-cut military mission on which they could focus their efforts.⁵

Indeed, the expected modernization of equipment, the participation in NATO joint exercises and the access to new doctrines, techniques and procedures would likely produce a sense of individual worth among members of the Spanish armed forces and entail better job performance. The natural result would be higher military professionalism and competence. In 1981, Lieutenant General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared he favored membership because "it would signify a new incentive to achieve better levels in the functioning of our forces."⁶

NATO membership and a closer relationship within Europe is also expected to increase Spain's technological capacity. The already mentioned link to EEC could satisfy its technological needs and provide the indispensable know-how for economic development. Particularly, the defense industry which employs about 70,000 could be highly stimulated, and the effective participation in current alliance's efforts to create a stronger defense, would have a salutary secondary effect on the nation's non-military sector.

An important advantage that would accrue from a NATO framework is related to the Gibraltar issue. This long standing dispute between Spain and England will very likely take some more years to be solved. The initial

negotiations were agreed upon last summer, but the Falkland crisis caused them to be cancelled. Basically the Spanish feel that with both countries in NATO the need for a British military presence in Gibraltar seems to be somewhat lessened. Thus, from a Spanish perspective, the necessary conditions to assume the administrative control of the rock are now in order. In this view, a friendly, interim solution could be contemplated. However, such a solution would undoubtedly create problems with Spain neighboring Morocco:

It may be possible, for example, to give Gibraltar the status of a special base under Spanish sovereignty but to be used jointly with the alliance. This would preclude the immediate withdrawal of the British fleet. In actual fact the problem is far more complex, since the Moroccan claims on the towns of Ceuta and Melilla also need to be considered simultaneously. King Hassan II of Morocco would not favor the idea of having both the northern and the southern litorals of the Straits under Spanish control and would therefore be likely to obtain U.S. support in insisting that this problem be resolved at the same time as that of Gibraltar.⁷

The Spanish-Gibraltar border has been reopened. However the search for a solution has been hampered by numerous problems, not the least of which is the pro-British position of the subjects living there and wanting to remain under British control. The British government is not keen in keeping control of the Rock because of the monetary costs. The key-stone of this problem must include NATO control of the Pillars of Hercules.

Another benefit Spain could enjoy from the Alliance

membership would be a possible aid in the battle against terrorism by the sharing of intelligence and supportive law-enforcement procedures among the NATO member countries.

In the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Soviet Union supported the non-enlargement of the military blocks, while NATO opposed it, in part, to protect the eventual adhesion of a democratic Spain to the Atlantic Alliance. Colonel Jonathan Alford, Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, explains the NATO position as follows:

Certainly it is comforting for members of the NATO club to know that it is a club that others want to join. NATO can convincingly demonstrate the voluntary nature of the association and can, moreover, take some pride in the fact that adherence to principles of democracy and freedom remains the prerequisite for membership.⁸

Clearly, from NATO's point of view, Spanish membership offers countless advantages. Politically, the joining of Spain had a highly positive meaning, evincing the Alliance's vitality when the West is making a serious effort to reduce its military imbalance relating to the Warsaw Pact. NATO's potential use of the Iberian Peninsula (the European redoubt) to regroup forces and decisively react against any aggressive action from the Warsaw Pact in Europe, is a passive but efficient form of deterrence. Moreover, Spain in NATO will insure the U.S. the uninterrupted use of Spanish military bases. In a broader sense, it is Spain's overall geostrategic significance, as discussed in Chapter 4, that represents

the largest advantage for NATO. Its geographical position, with access to both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and a foot in north Africa, would bolster the Alliance's flanks and give NATO the defense in depth it is so badly lacking. Further, according to the document prepared by the International Secretariat of the North Atlantic Assembly on April 2, 1982 designated areas of Spanish territory could provide possible sites for year-round bombing, artillery training and ground maneuver area for NATO forces, currently a problem in central Europe.⁹

Another perhaps equally important factor that makes Spain vital to NATO is the considerable potential contribution in sheer numbers of forces. And Spain, while strengthening NATO's military posture through its participation, will obviously be more secure as part of the Alliance. Indeed, the addition of Spain's 348,000 armed forces and 1,085,000 reservists would provide enhanced conventional defense capability. The Spanish army is the largest of the three services (see Annex B, drawn from "The Military Balance 1982-1983") with 190,000 conscripts and 65,000 professionals and regulars. It is composed of three major groups: rapid intervention (3 divisions), territorial defense (a brigade acting as garrison for each of the nine military districts), and general reserve (6 regiments). A most logical suggestion for an army role in NATO is to utilize it, possibly altogether with the Marine forces (11,000), as a strategic reserve. Given the existing imbalance with the

Warsaw Pact in any of the three major NATO commands, these reinforcements could be deployed to the northern, central or southern Europe. The deployment is possible, by land through France or by sea sailing from El Ferrol to northern and central regions and from Barcelona to the southern flank. The movements by sea could be accomplished by units of the navy with the support of the large Spanish merchant fleet. Moreover, anti-submarine aircraft and coastal escorts could be provided by Spain as well as other NATO nations.¹⁰ The movement by air would equally be possible using Spanish military assets (if necessary augmented by the considerable national airline fleets). The Spanish army or marine forces used in these referred strategic roles, rather than a pre-positioned geographical area of responsibility on the northern, central or southern regions, must be seen in terms of "rear" reserve to a rapid reinforcement.

But it is Spain's naval force that could contribute the most valuable and immediate commitment to the Alliance. The defense of the Mediterranean could be substantially enhanced through Spanish contribution. Should a crisis occur in other regions, such as in the Persian Gulf area, redeployment of the U.S. Sixth Fleet out of the Mediterranean would be possible with less risk to NATO's southern flank. In the Atlantic, the Spanish navy could also provide invaluable support in the protection of east-west transatlantic approaches using El Ferrol on the northwestern coast. Also,

in the south Atlantic, where Soviet presence has been increasingly noted, the Canary Island bases offer an excellent position to reinforce the anti-submarine defense of sea lines of communications. To accomplish these tasks, Spain would count above all on the Combat Group of its Navy. "The group is equipped with V/STOL aircraft and ocean-going escorts, conventional attack submarines, ASW helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft and tactical units based on airfields along the coast and inland."¹¹

The Spanish air force (See Annex B for strength and types of aircraft and helicopters) could be employed to patrol Mediterranean waters, confer coastal movements protection and, together with the navy, provide a lift capacity to elements of the army. In fact, the air movement of ground forces is clearly a capability for which the Spanish have long planned, if we bear in mind its traditional overseas interests, along with the sizeable forces still deployed in north Africa (Ceuta and Mellila) and Canary Islands.

In addition to a standard military role in NATO, Spain could contribute to the current ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force or even to make a second peacetime ACE Mobile Force.

The use of Spanish bases by NATO aircraft could also allow more dispersion, thus reducing its vulnerability. Moreover, in the event of conflict the entire space of the Iberian Peninsula could function either as a transit center,

a bridgehead at the rear of Europe or as an advance base for reinforcements from North America.

In addition to its space and actual forces, Spain can contribute considerably to the pool of military equipment available to contingency operations. The Atlantic Alliance "suffers from a chronic shortage of reserve weapons, munitions and fuel. Tanks, all types of precision guided missiles, infantry fighting vehicles and fighter and ground support aircraft are not stocked in quantity."¹² These are areas where, to some extent, Spain can compensate for this shortage (see Annex B). During past years, Spain has been making a big effort toward equipment modernization, and, for example, its semi-automatic air-defense system is "one of the most up to date in the world. This system fits snugly into the bloc system, for according to the agreement on cooperation and friendship between Spain and the USA, it was blueprinted and built up by an American firm."¹³

Any possible role we might consider for Spanish armed forces as a member of NATO's military structure, would raise immediately the issue of command structure. Spain has important naval and air forces in both the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The NATO commands controlling these areas are respectively, the Southern Command Europe (AFSOUTH) which reports to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) which reports to Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Spain's

options within this command structure are numerous. However, Spain would in any case expect its own NATO command taking into account its potentially strong influence on the western Mediterranean. One possible solution would be the recreation of the West Mediterranean Command under a Spanish Admiral. This command would include the Straits of Gibraltar and its approaches. The British would undoubtedly have a part to play in it and further arrangements between Britain and Spain under the NATO flag could help a successful outcome for the Gibraltar issue.

On the eastern Atlantic, Spanish analysts also claim an important role for Spain because:

...half the Spanish shores and more than half the Spanish ports are on the Atlantic. Moreover, the Canary Islands not only call for an important Atlantic defence role but are also an asset the responsibility over which cannot be transferred to anybody.¹⁴

For this reason, from a Spanish perspective, the IBERLANT area command should be shared alternatively by a Portuguese and a Spanish admiral. But an alteration here, just when the command has finally been given to Portugal, would certainly be unacceptable to Portugal, a founder member and the only all-Atlantic country in Europe (the boundary between SACLANT and SACEUR follows the Portuguese-Spanish border). Even more, Portugal has been trying to alter the area of responsibility of the IBERLANT in order to include the Portuguese Azores archipelago. This latter proposal is opposed by the United States because the strategic position of the Azores is of the

utmost importance for the whole north Atlantic defense. Again, a possible solution answering Spanish claims on the Atlantic area would be the creation of a Canary Island command at the same level of the existing for Madeira (ISCOMADEIRA), both reporting to IBERLANT Command.¹⁵

For the land forces, and in order to preserve the strategic integrity and unity of the Iberian Peninsula, a common Iberian command should be created. The command headquarters could have a central position somewhere near Madrid. Commanded by a Spanish general it would report, together with the Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (Verona, Italy) and Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe (Izmir, Turkey), to the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (Naples, Italy).

As a result of the new Iberian Peninsula Command, the current boundary SACLANT/SACEUR would be moved from the Portuguese-Spanish border to the Portuguese-Atlantic border. On the other hand, current Portuguese contribution to NATO, an airborne separate brigade, designated to be deployed to the north of Italy, would very likely have its mission changed and integrated under a Portuguese NATO command reporting to the Peninsular Command.

Apart from the question of command and control, Spain's membership would create additional concerns, both for Spain and NATO. Under an internal Spanish perspective, the first and most obvious factor working against membership is the lack of domestic consensus favoring it. The Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (PSOE), now in power, and the

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THE IBERIAN PENINSULA IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY:
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
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
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Communists have always opposed membership. In effect, the Spanish Left has a different view from UCD, the previously ruling coalition, in many respects. On the security question, the Left simply argues that no likely external threat to Spain exists because it is geographically removed from the central European front and is, at present, distant from major east-west tensions. The involvement of Spain in the tensions of superpowers and military blocs makes it an identified target, thus diminishing rather than enhancing its security. Moreover, the protection of overseas interests, an immediate Spanish concern, are not within the accords of the Alliance. Also a negative consequence for Spain is a reduced national freedom of choice which may affect its traditional privileged relations with the non-allied countries in general and with the Arab World in particular.

From an international standpoint, a possible negative outcome may result to the West since while the adhesion of Spain will not significantly alter the current east-west balance,

... it is not clear that this would either make the Soviet Union more peaceful nor contribute to the unity of the Alliance. It is unlikely that the addition of Spain to the Alliance would intimidate the Soviet Union, while at the same time it is possible that a change in the long-standing line-up of the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers would induce the perceived need in the Soviet Union for a "compensation" of some sort.¹⁶

Another concern for NATO, or at least for the members in the central front, is a potential fear that the addition of Spain may bring with it a redoubt concept, as opposed to the forward defense strategy.

If, for a complete analysis of pros and cons on this issue we can introduce as many factors as we want, we must also admit that in most cases they can be handled both ways. Selecting what we consider the most significant ones and aligning them into geostrategic, economic, political and military, we can say that:

Geostrategically, the advantages of membership are enormous. The Iberian Peninsula is a unit and could be used by the Alliance as such. As discussed the peninsular archipelagos and positions in north Africa are excellent complements for power projection and control over the western Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic.

Economically, Spain within NATO can see its entry to the EEC facilitated and this is a common goal among the main political forces: "The remodelling of Spain on a western European basis is one of the few givens of the political scene in the country."¹⁷ The EEC is Spain's most important partner in export-import trade and this importance tends to grow. EEC countries absorbed most emigration of Spanish workers in the 1960's, and contribute yearly with about two thirds of all tourists coming to Spain. For many observers this is in fact the main issue:

All other issues pale when compared with EEC entry. Spain sees membership as not only the sole viable alternative for the future development, economic and political, of the country, but also as a fundamentally valuable and important experiment in which the country, given its geography and history, is fortunate enough to share.¹⁸

Politically, NATO membership can help to consolidate Spanish democracy. However, as mentioned before, while UCD, through Calvo Sotelo pushed strongly toward membership, the PSOE now in power, has always defended non-alignment. This lack of consensus is, according to this author's point of view, the only serious disadvantage. Even so, some evolution can be predicted within the Socialists. First of all, for Felipe Gonzalez this is not a priority issue. On the other hand, Mário Soares, the Portuguese Socialist leader, who as expected won in the April 1983 elections, might play an interesting role softening Gonzalez's doubts about membership advantages. In effect, Soares' victory, leading to the situation of Socialist administrations in both peninsular countries, will necessarily bring new dynamics to the political relations of the two leaders. In a broader European perspective and in the presence of the support of European Socialism, specifically that of Germany, the peninsular Socialist forces will not fail to consider the necessity and advantage of presenting a common perspective in what concerns NATO.

Finally, Spain's armed forces would strengthen the integrated military structure of the Alliance. The army is

large, disciplined and has some units of excellent standing. The navy can very easily be integrated under NATO functions and provide an immediate reinforcement to the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. The air force is a good general fighting asset which would strengthen the air arm of NATO. Through an impressive Spanish effort in past years, equipment modernization is under way. The integration of Spanish armed forces in ACE mobile force and/or a strong contribution for a strategic reserve in the European scene are adequate roles to be considered. Strengthening NATO through its participation, Spain is also enhancing its own security.

In summary, Spain has much to offer and much to gain by joining the NATO Alliance.

CHAPTER 5

ENDNOTES

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4. David B. Richardson, "Coups Fail, But is Spain's Democracy Safe?", US News and World Report, March 9, 1981, p. 32.
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CHAPTER 6

THE THREAT

I. The Soviet Expansion


Shortly after World War II, a new massive danger from the east began to take shape against the nations of Western Europe. While the European countries, devastated by the war, pursued a policy of rebuilding their debilitated economies and, along with the United States, of disarming and demobilizing, the Soviet Union maintained a force of about four million soldiers under arms, most of them in combat units deployed in Europe.¹ As a consequence, Stalin found himself in a comfortable position to exert political pressure, operating on a world-wide dimension. The first steps of this trend took place immediately in Europe, where a series of disputes against the allies made them increasingly aware of this new post-war threat. This East-West confrontation included: who would rule post-war Poland; the Soviet prolonged occupation of Iran, in 1946; the threats to Greece and Turkey, in 1946-47; the Soviet move to establish a Communist government in Czechoslovakia, in 1948; and the Soviet provocation of the Berlin blockade in 1948-49. These critical events created alarm within Europe and the United States. In response to the Soviet policy of

power projection, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. Two years before, the United States had already announced the Truman Doctrine, the aim of which was "to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."²

The Soviet Union did not seem to be impressed. As an answer to the NATO military alliance, it directed the eastern European satellites to sign a treaty "On Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid" in 1955, which then gave rise to the military organization of the Warsaw Pact. But long before, Soviet expansionism had already begun through the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and some regions of Finland, as well as of Poland, Rumania, north-eastern Germany and eastern Czechoslovakia (about 180,000 square miles and 23 million inhabitants - Map 11).³

Until the late 50's the security of western European countries depended on the U.S. nuclear umbrella "massive retaliation" strategy, but this reliance was somewhat undercut when the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949 and its first hydrogen bomb in 1953.

With the death of Stalin (1953), Soviet strategy experienced significant changes. Malenkov, and later Krushchev, followed the so-called policy of "peaceful coexistence". On the other hand, the Soviet Union emerged, after 1957, as a nuclear power with a potential capability matching that of the United States. This same year, the



MAP 11: Soviet Expansion 1940-48.

Source: NATO Facts and Figures, 1978, p. 16

successful launching of the first sputnik announced a future military advance in the field of long-range missiles. However, Krushev's anxiety to gain strategic superiority, or at least parity, led him to the Cuban missile adventure (1962) -- the worst humiliation for the Soviet Union since World War II:

Krushev's covert missile build-up was discovered before it was operationally ready, and the Soviets, faced with U.S. nuclear, as well as conventional, superiority, were forced to back down. While this incident was an essential element in the subsequent dampening of tensions between the superpowers, it also taught the Soviets a hard lesson: the shadow of military power was no substitute for its substance.⁴

The lesson was well learned by the Soviets. They replaced Krushev with Brëzhnev in 1964 and realized that their military power had to be strengthened. Indeed, Brezhnev was able to lead his country to a strong military establishment steadily built throughout the late 60's and the 70's as shown in the following table:

| FORCES | 1964 | 1980 |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Strategic | | |
| ICBMs | 190 | 1,398 |
| SLBMs | 29 | 950 |
| Bombers | 170 | 156 |
| Total Weapons (warheads) | 400 | 6,000 |
| Land | | |
| Tanks | 30,000 | 45,000 |
| Divisions | 145 | 170 |
| Artillery tubes/rocket launchers | 11,000 | 20,000 |

| FORCES | 1964 | 1980 |
|--|-----------|-----------|
| Tactical Air | | |
| Fighter/attack aircraft | 3,500 | 4,500 |
| Naval | | |
| Major surface combatants and amphibious ships | 260 | 360 |
| Other naval vessels | 1,440 | 1,200 |
| Total naval tonnage | 2,000,000 | 2,800,000 |
| Total military manpower | 3,400,000 | 4,400,000 |
| Total defense spending | \$105 | \$175 |
| Military investment (procurement, milcon, R&D) | \$ 49 | \$ 80 |

Source: U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981, p. 37.

Brezhnev's success can be explained by a number of factors. These include the long United States preoccupation with its involvement in the Vietnamese war, the policy of "detente" with its high point in 1972 when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), the curtailed military spendings by US and most western European countries. Other significant causes include different perceptions of the threat by the US and western Europe and a conflict of interests expressed through contradictory views such as the gas pipeline issue, which was skillfully used by Brezhnev in the prosecution of his aims.


Besides the purely military threat posed by the Soviet Union to the western world, which is greater than

ever before, we could also see that after 1973, with different degrees of Soviet implication, pro-Moscow oriented Communist parties seized power in Vietnam, Laos, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea (Bissao), Cambodia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). These events represent the fulfillment of Stalin's views, after 1945, of a Soviet diplomacy and political influence acting on a world-wide scale and relying on its strongest asset, the military establishment:

...throughout the 1970's the United States had to contend with the fact that the Soviet Union had not only obtained nuclear parity but in some indices of the strategic balance was actually ahead.⁵

II. The Threat at Sea and Quest for the Mediterranean

The strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC), which are vital for western European countries have their intersection in the Iberian Peninsula. This region, because of its geographic location and its Portuguese and Spanish archipelagos, has an immediate projection on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, which makes it an excellent control point to keep those SLOC open. On the other hand, Soviet naval strategy includes the blockade of NATO sea lines of communication (SLOC). In the Mediterranean Sea, which used to be a European lake, the balance has been substantially altered according to the new Soviet ambitions



MAP 12: Major Surface Combatant Mean Daily Force Levels in Mediterranean (by month), 1967-1975

Source: Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, ed., Soviet Diplomacy, 1979, p. 48.

at sea (Map 12):

The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean is but a clear illustration of the shift from a continental to a global maritime strategy by the Soviets in the 1960's.⁶

The roots of Russia's goal towards an impressive naval power can be found by the time of Czar Nicholas II (1893-1912) when the new battleships and cruisers of the Baltic Fleet could be seen in the Mediterranean and Far East region (either in Vladivostok or Port Arthur). Also, as Michael Mcc Gwire noted:

...ambitious building programs and a large navy are nothing new for Russia, and for the last 100 years she has needed substantial forces to defend against assault from the sea and to thwart attempts by maritime powers to dictate the outcome of events in adjacent areas. Nor has the navy been overlooked in Soviet contingency for war.⁷

Such broad naval objectives announced, for the first time, a new worldwide Russian naval policy. It was the materialized expression of the then-captain Nikolai Klado's writings. The theories of Klado, also known as the "Russian Mahan" lost, however, some credibility because of the unsuccessful outcome of the war against Japan (1904-05) with the fall of Port Arthur and the Battle of Tsushima. For a defeated and weakened Soviet fleet, a less ambitious mission had to be found:

Under the circumstances, the primary Russian naval objectives were to protect the seaward flanks of Russian armies fighting on the European and Caucasian fronts and to deny the enemy entrance to the Gulf of Finland and the power center around St. Petersburg, by means

of an 'active coastal defense'.⁸

This defensively oriented thinking did not last very long. Some years later, the Czar's new military advisers came out with offensive theories and Klado regained his audience. As such, in 1912, a deft naval minister, Vice-Admiral Ivan K. Grigorovich presented a thorough comprehensive plan for the construction of a new fleet and succeeded in getting it approved by the parliament. That ambitious plan included the construction of three squadrons for the Baltic and one squadron for the Black Sea (each squadron to include 8 battleships, 4 cruisers, 4 battle cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 36 destroyers and 12 submarines). Construction for the new fleet was to start immediately and earmarked for completion by 1930. However, when World War I broke out only the large destroyer Natzie, built in Germany, was completed. So, the Russian navy had to fight the war with whatever ships were available and the Gregorovich plan was by necessity subverted. During the early stage of the war, the Russians decided to accelerate battleship construction in the Baltic and the Black Sea projecting well armed 45,000 ton super battleships together with a number of "Borodino" battle cruisers. But by the end of World War I the strength of the Russian fleet was severely eroded both because of its losses in the war against Germany and as a result of the naval operations during the Civil War which followed the October Revolution of 1917, to include the

uprising of the sailors at Kronstadt against Lenin in 1921. This situation meant again a starting point to a new Russian navy. Meanwhile, the ideas of Klado (now rear admiral in command of the Naval Academy until his death in 1919), that represented the "classical school", were taught in the Naval Academy by Professors Petrov and Gervais. And, under the central doctrine of control of the seas, a reconstruction plan was conducted in the period 1921-25. It was also envisaged that by 1930, the building of 8 battleships, 16 cruisers and 60 destroyers would be completed. But the internal situation in Russia led to a different strategic thinking that defended an active coastal defense as opposed to the idea of naval supremacy. This new school had, as its highest representative, Professor Alexandrov who was able to defeat his opponents Petrov and Gervais. The new construction plan (1926) reflected this change and included the building within six years of 12 submarines, 18 coastal patrol ships (small destroyers) and 36 torpedo boats. This program was integrated in a five-year plan 1928-32 and successively adapted in the following five-year plan 1932-37. However, the Alexandrov's concept of "active coastal defense" was to lose its currency, since, from then on (by 1937), the Red Fleet was already capable of projecting power beyond the coastal waters and could look toward a "naval supremacy". This new shift was evident during the 1937-38 Stalin purges when the coastal defense doctrine

was abandoned. Stalin favored a blue water navy and for that reason in the third five-year plan (1938-42), an ambitious shipbuilding and fleet armament program had the highest priority. Together with the ships from the previous five-year plan, the constructions initiated in 1938 were to include 10 battleships (Sovetskiy Soyus), 6 battle cruisers (Kronstadt), 10 cruisers (Chapaev) and 4 other cruisers, 12 flotilla leaders (Kiev), 96 destroyers (Ognevoi), 24 coastal patrol ships (Yastreb), 24 fast steam-driven minesweepers (Poluchin) and about 200 large, medium and small submarines.

The Second World War broke out in 1939, but Stalin made a pact with Hitler that same year and obviously sought time to continue his construction plan. Only in October 1940 did he doubt Hitler's intentions and put an emphasis on the build up of the army. He also rearranged the priorities in shipbuilding favoring the accelerated production of destroyers, submarines and small combatant ships. The Germans attacked in fact, in June 1941, and the Russian navy was fundamentally committed to a mission in support of the Army. Particularly in 1943, when three of the seven modern destroyers still left were sunk by a German raid on the Crimean Coast, Stalin decided not to employ the bigger ships (from destroyers up). He wanted to save them for his intended post-war projects for a new fleet. Gorshkov, the supreme commander of the Navy since 1951, in his writing "The


Sea Power of the State", published in 1976, says that "this employment of naval forces was the only correct one and it was in every way appropriate to the situation."⁹ On the other hand, Gorshkov always considered adequate naval forces absolutely necessary to fight a global war. He would comment that Hitler "could not force Great Britain to capitulate without adequate naval forces."¹⁰ This way, he extolled the need for a huge naval buildup which was expressed through the revised first fleet construction program adopted in December 1946 for the post-war period.

By 1953, the Soviets renewed their ever increasing policy of power projection of deploying warships into the Mediterranean. Following this buildup of naval influence in the area, the new submarines of the series "Wiskey" made their appearance in 1958 being stationed in Valona Bay (Albania). The ideological dispute with Albania, however, caused the submarines to be ordered out of Valona in 1961 and this led Gorshkov to pay a visit to Egypt in search of an agreement to Soviet access to Egyptian ports. At this time Nasser rejected his request, but the Soviets were determined to achieve a permanent deployment of naval forces in the Mediterranean. Gorshkov announced this intent in February 1963 when he referred that the naval defense of the Soviet Union "would henceforth depend on naval engagements fought far from the country's shore."¹¹ The declaration to extend the outer defense zone (to a 1,500 n.m. circle from

Moscow) envisaged an initial USSR answer to the American sub-surface ballistic nuclear (SSBN) missiles, the main sea-borne threat to the Soviet Union recently sent to the area. In 1965 the Russians increased the number of ships in the Mediterranean fleet from 8 to 12. Such a reinforcement increased their need for access to supporting ports in the area instead of the open anchorages used till then (Map 13). During his visits to Egypt in March 1965 and in January 1967, Gorshkov sought for the permission of facilities off the Egyptian coast. Pressure was also exerted by Moscow on Algeria, Yugoslavia and Syria, with the same objective. The negotiations with Egypt were successfully formalized in 1968 through a secret five-year arrangement. Alexandria became the main supporting point for the Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, to include the use of the airbase Cairo West, from where the planes (TU-16 Badgers, with Egyptian markings) would conduct reconnaissance missions over the sixth fleet.

Meanwhile, and as a response to the increased range of American submarine launched ballistic missiles (SSBM), the USSR extended again the outer defense zone (now to a 2,500 N.M. circle from Moscow, reaching the eastern half of the north Atlantic and northern half of the Arabian Sea).

By 1969, and because of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav government refused to admit any kind of arrangement concerning the request to port facilities. The



MAP 13: Primary Soviet Replenishment Anchorages in the Mediterranean.

Source: Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, ed., Soviet Naval Diplomacy, 1979, p. 65.

negotiated positions in Egypt were therefore enhanced to support the Soviet Fifth Escadra (Squadron) then numbering about forty naval units, to include at least ten submarines. The Russian surveillance of the Sixth Fleet was now being extended to the western Mediterranean. To meet this goal, new negotiations were tried with Algeria and Spain. Gorshkov spent a week in Algeria, in 1970, and renewed the request for port facilities. The access to the naval facilities was not conceded but the reconnaissance aircrafts were authorized to use Algerian airfields. Earlier, in 1969, there were also indications that Moscow was pressing Spain about some arrangements to establish a base at Alboran Island some 150 miles east of Gibraltar. "In the same year a shipping agreement was signed between Moscow and Madrid which secured port facilities for Soviet merchant vessels in Barcelona."¹²

The Soviet Union complemented all these actions with an important force modernization in the late 1960's which led to a real parity by 1972. The Charlie-class submarine cruise missile (SSGN) was introduced in 1968 and had the capability of submerged missile launch. The other important achievement under force modernization was the Backfire. With its increased operating range as compared to the Badger and the Blinder, it solved the Soviet navy requirement for an anti-carrier weapon with the capability to cover all the Mediterranean and even fly missions into the Atlantic.

Special emphasis was also put on more capable anti-submarine warfare (ASW) surface ships. The ASW cruiser "Moskva" (1967), although there was a question of its survivability when used in long operations under hostile environment, was a typical example of the new trend toward larger and more capable ASW ships. Its successor, the "Kiev" was designed to solve the lack of endurance and presented increased possibilities with its air defense missiles, vertical take-off aircrafts and ASW helicopters.

The year of 1972 brought an unexpected setback to the Soviet Union in its quest to extend its influence over the Mediterranean. Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt, ordered the expulsion of some 15,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians from Egypt. The Fifth Escadra in the Mediterranean, numbering between 50 to 60 ships, still retained port facilities, but Sadat's strong reaction made the Kremlin understand that the access to those facilities was not completely assured. The maritime patrol and ASW missions from the six Egyptian airfields, then being used by Soviet "Badgers" and "Mays", came to an end. Once more Moscow sought alternate support points in the Mediterranean, conducting intensified negotiations and exerting pressures over various countries such as Syria, Algeria, Libya and Yugoslavia. As a result, the "Badgers" initially stationed in Egypt were transferred to Syria and an agreement related to the use of naval facilities was reached. In Yugoslavia,

in 1974, the Soviet Union could finally have access to naval repair facilities. In Libya, Qaddafi rejected initially (1973) the request for the use of former U.S. bases, but the continuous pressure and the delivery of large amounts of arms and equipment led to the authorization of the use of those bases in 1975. The relations with Egypt were seriously degraded in 1976, when President Sadat ordered the evacuation of all Russian forces from Alexandria and definitely cancelled the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This decision was of the utmost importance to the interests of the West in that strategic area, opening the door to the U.S.-Egyptian rapprochement of the years to come.

Again the renewed Soviet pressures to gain access to naval bases in the Mediterranean during the 1970's were accompanied by a continuing effort to increase its naval power. Under the detected reorientation in the late 1960's of the Russian Navy's strategic defensive mission, from an anti-carrier to an ASW-oriented force, the number of deployed strategic ASW platforms was impressive:

In the two decades since the mission was assigned, the Navy has acquired a fleet of approximately 90 major surface combatants (4,000 tons or larger) designed specifically for the ASW mission, compared with no such warships in 1960. In addition, the Soviets acquired a considerable number of aircraft devoted to the ASW task, including helicopters and verticle take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft on the Moskva and Kiev-class cruisers.¹³

The results of the 60's and 70's programs can be seen in the current Soviet fleet. The fairly constant

construction of about 10 submarines a year (mainly SSN's and SSBN's - Torpedo Attack and Ballistic Missile nuclear powered submarines) "can be read as the development of a strategic missile force and also the means to protect it against NATO ASW attackers."¹⁴ To fully accomplish this goal, the Russians still need a much greater number of hunter-killer submarines like the advanced Alpha-class SSN's, the only one which "conceivably could pose a serious threat to our Lafayette-and Ohio-class SSBN's."¹⁵

The early 1980's show new types of ships and submarines in the threat inventory. Through the analysis of its characteristics, we may devise another shift in Soviet naval role. The "Kirov" is the largest surface warship built after WWII. This nuclear powered 25,000 ton unit has the most advanced Russian cruise missile and ASW system. On the submarine side, besides the already mentioned Alpha-class, also two types of large nuclear-powered submarines have emerged: the Typhoon¹⁶ follow-on for the Delta is armed with 24 nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, and the Oscar is even bigger and armed with 24 long-range (450km) anti-ship missiles.

This submarine construction altogether with the "Kirov", other types of surface combatants (battle cruiser, cruiser, destroyer, frigate) and the naval aircraft, where the "Backfire" is expected to replace the "Badger", are a clear illustration of Gorshkov's view of a balanced fleet.

These impressive assets are well suited to his broad concept of world sea power. Soviet naval doctrine sees a significant participation of the navy in a possible nuclear conflict or in a limited war around strategic, disputed areas like the Middle East. Soviet naval forces, in spite of some constraints imposed by geography and shrinking military resources, have been able to build up an increasing capability to extend its presence worldwide, should a conflict or a crisis occur. As Joseph Luns recently stated:

The Soviets are increasingly using their navy for political ends. They seem willing to use naval power when they believe it can be effectively employed to a real advantage and not just as a reaction to events. The use of naval forces frequently results in a greater penetration of a target state and an increased Soviet presence after a crisis.

The Mediterranean is no longer, exclusively, a "NATO lake". It is now shared by a powerful Soviet presence. The Sixth Fleet is quickly becoming less capable of unilaterally assuring a credible deterrence in the Mediterranean and its Atlantic approach. Therefore, it is self-evident that the strategic position of the Iberian Peninsula with its archipelagos will play a significant role to meet NATO's goal -- the defense of its member nations.

CHAPTER 6

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

I. A Revitalized Atlantic Community

The legacy of World War II was a devastated Europe -- a Europe that needed rebuilding. This proved to be a gigantic effort, the success of which was intimately related to the crucial decision by the United States to strengthen its ties with West Europe. The Marshall Plan, besides the economical aid, meant a political and ideological tie directed to the defense of western civilization. The Soviet Union, drawing an Iron Curtain through the center of Europe, necessitated the peoples west of that barrier to strengthen their inter-relations. The emerging Atlantic Community and its military defensive expression -- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were immediate and indispensable tools directed to preserve and revitalize the cultural values herein contained:

The Atlantic Community concept embodied the heritage of Hellenism, the Judeo-Christian religions, the spirit of scientific inquiry, the tenets of pluralism, and representative government, all of which represent values central to western civilization. Yet, it seems fair to generalize in retrospect that this 'cultural cement' was subsumed under the 'cement of fear'. In its initial manifestation, the Atlantic Community was essentially a defensive concept, which found tangible expression in the military realm - in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹

More than thirty years after its foundation, NATO is facing one of the most difficult phases of its existence. This situation is surely to last for this decade and will last longer should adequate corrective measures continue to be delayed. The Warsaw Pact, as seen in Chapter 6, has steadily moved toward the goal of military hegemony and pursued a policy of expansionism which was successfully imposed on different regions such as Southwest Asia and Africa. Carter's administration, despite its clear offensive on human rights, which undoubtedly troubled Soviet leadership, left the Alliance weakened both by a domestic defense policy which did not counter the Soviet military build-up and by not giving adequate attention to the sensitivities of its European allies.

Present trends indicate that a turning point has been reached and a stronger NATO is being developed. Reagan's defense policy is primarily aimed at the creation of a military capability credible to deter Soviet expansionism. This unilateral action by the U.S. served as an example and a stimulus for the NATO allies to increase their defense expenditures. At the same time, the overall relations between the two sides of the Atlantic have been improved, creating better conditions for the achievement of a coherent policy of the Atlantic Community vis-a-vis the Soviet Union

II. The Iberian Peninsula's Potential Contribution

Within the overall policy of reinforcing NATO's political, geostrategic, and military capability, the Iberian Peninsula has a new and important role to play.

- Politically, the recent democratic regimes established in Spain and Portugal were the keystone achievements which ultimately resulted in the return of the Iberian countries to the western family of nations. Portugal, a founder member of NATO saw its condition of "tolerated" partner changed into a fully integrated member. After the pro forma opposition by some NATO members was resolved, Spain was at long last welcomed into the Alliance by mid-1982.

Both countries are now waiting for their admittance into the Common Market (EEC) after a long process of negotiations. Because of the economic crisis situation in Spain and Portugal, EEC membership is considered an important step to stabilize and shore up the two young democracies. With both Portugal and Spain members of NATO, they must be provided adequate political and economic support as well as immediate access into the EEC.

In, turn Portugal's privileged relations towards the new Portuguese speaking countries in Africa, coupled with the close relation between Spain and the Arab and Latin American countries can be used to the benefit of common western interests.

- Geostrategically and as seen in Chapter 4, the Iberian Peninsula must be seen as a unit. Its geographical location in the rear southwestern corner of Europe with an "almost island" configuration provides the European theater of operations with the depth so badly needed by NATO planners, and allow dispersion mainly for air assets. From there, a regrouping is also possible for counter offensives in the northern, central and southern front sectors:

In the event of calamity, Spain can be made a stronghold in whose expanse of land, and in whose numerous ports and airfields refuge could be found to recoup and to rebuild offensive strength from the remnants of NATO's European and reinforcing U.S. forces.²

The Portuguese archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira, together with the Spanish Canary and Alboran Sea islands, and positions in the North African coast (Ceuta and Mellila) represent an important tool to control the north Atlantic and the Mediterranean seas. Specifically the sea lines of communications (SLOC) from the American continent, and traffic (mainly oil tankers) from the south Atlantic toward northern Europe and/or the Mediterranean can be better protected through an adequate use of those strategic Portuguese and Spanish positions.

The logistics support with several aircraft refueling locations in the peninsular continental area and its archipelagos is another important capacity for a potential NATO use and especially for the United States. In this respect the facilities of Lajes in the Portuguese Azores are probably

the most crucial support point as clearly evinced in the Yom Kippur War.

Also under a scenario of a deteriorated situation in the North African region, either by a change of the present pro-west Moroccan regime or by an openly declared NATO hostile environment in the radical Arab states such as Algeria or Libya, the Iberian countries can offer suitable positions from where NATO could exert an effective control. The Canary and Madeira Islands near the western African coast the cities of Ceuta and Mellila, the bases on the southern coast of Spain, and the Balearics would form a protective ring in case of distabilizing events in North Africa.

As seen in Chapter 6, the Mediterranean is no longer the "European lake". To take on the role of manning its western gate in conjunction with the British owned choke point of Gibraltar, the Spanish positions are obviously of incomparable value. Furthermore, the Spanish navy would represent a significant reinforcement to maintain NATO hegemony in the western Mediterranean.

- Militarily, the Iberian Peninsula's contribution to NATO is currently limited to the Portuguese Separate Airborne Brigade (together with a minimal contribution to the AMF) and to the use of Portuguese and Spanish bases by the United States.

Spain's NATO contribution is being negotiated. When

complete, the Iberian nations' potential benefits accrued to NATO in Chapter 5 would come into being. Briefly, the Spanish forces would give NATO a boost in terms of the conventional balance in Europe. It is logical to assume that Spain will contribute forces to the ACE Mobile Force in peacetime, and in wartime Spanish assets will most likely be seen as part of a strategic reserve. The Spanish navy, generally considered the most modern and efficient of the three services, could provide an immediate role in the ASW area.

Regretably, the near future does not seem favorable toward Spain's integration into the military structure, since the new Spanish Socialist government has halted (perhaps temporarily) this process. Nevertheless, it is assumed, Spain's contribution to the military structure is only a matter of time, and very likely it will be accomplished before the end of this decade. Two scenarios can be envisaged. First, the Spanish Socialist government, to achieve a successful four-year term, has to express unequivocally a choice toward a close west European connection in order to receive necessary economical aid. It will also be sensitive to the neighboring Portuguese Socialists who favor the military block contribution. The second scenario is the fall of the Socialist government or its defeat in the next election. With the fall of the Socialists, a central coalition within Spain would surely integrate Spain's armed forces into the

NATO military structure.

Most commentators of NATO affairs agree that sooner or later Spain will join the military structure. The resulting interrelationship between Spain and Portugal must be addressed. Bearing in mind the brief historical overview provided in Chapters 2 and 3, we can better understand that only now conditions are created for an open, mutually beneficial dialogue between the two Iberian neighbors. The Iberian Pact signed by both countries on March 17, 1939, was just "a friendship and nonaggression pact designed to protect the countries regimes by ensuring neither would become a base of attack against the other..."³ and did not convey any special military collaboration. In 1977 the new democratic regimes recognized the obsolescence of the Iberian Pact and revised it. As Mário Soares, then Prime Minister, put it when speaking to the Spanish daily "ABC" correspondent in Lisbon:

I have always thought that it was necessary to revise the Iberian Pact. It had been converted into an obviously obsolete diplomatic instrument with ideological connotations no longer adequate to the two peninsular countries' circumstances.⁴

The new Iberian Pact (1977) needs now to be followed by specific steps addressing the Iberian Peninsula's role in the defense of western Europe. As mentioned, NATO seems to be the adequate framework under which a consensus can be reached.

The alleged fears in some Portuguese circles that Lisbon's status in NATO could be drastically reduced with the entry of an incomparable larger force, do not correspond to the official view. As early as May 1981 (one year before Spain had joined NATO), then Portuguese Foreign Minister Andre' Goncalves Pereira when asked whether some jealousy existed between Spain and Portugal with regard to playing a prominent strategic role in NATO, declared:

The idea that Portugal might be jealous of Spain's entry into the alliance because of strategic considerations is untrue. On the contrary, Spain's entry will strengthen southern Europe's representation within NATO and more particularly the Iberian Peninsula's role. As far as we are concerned, there are no objections and no sense of rivalry. Spain's contribution will complement and strengthen the peninsula's defense role.⁵

Notwithstanding the altruistic comments of the former Foreign Minister, and as anticipated in Chapter 5 , some difficulties can be expected about the new distribution of maritime and land Iberian commands when contemplating Spain's integration in the military structure. It must be emphasized "the need to make sure that military arrangements in the Iberian Peninsula do not produce political frictions that outweigh specific military advantages."⁶ However, a final formula will surely be found to satisfy both Portugal and Spain. Whatever the problems may be, it will always be possible to reach a successful negotiation. After all, democratic discussion and the existence of different views

within NATO are lively characteristics of the alliance.

The ultimate goal is undoubtedly to take advantage of the synergetic effect of both countries in NATO as a sizeable peninsular reinforcement against present expansionist trends of the Warsaw Pact.

CHAPTER 7

ENDNOTES

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APPENDIX

ANNEX A
ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT'S PROCLAMATION
ON THE 25th APRIL 1974

Considering that after 13 years of fighting overseas the present political system has been unable to define an overseas policy leading to peace among Portuguese of all races and creeds;

Considering the growing climate of total detachment of the Portuguese in relation to political responsibilities they owe as citizens, the growing development of a situation of constant appeals to duty with a parallel denial of rights;

Considering the necessity to clean institutions, eliminating from our system of life the illegal acts that the abuse of power has legalized;

Considering, finally, the duty of the armed forces and the defense of the nation, signifying also the civic liberty of its citizens:

The Movement of the Armed Forces, which has just achieved the most important civic mission in recent years, proclaims to the nation its intention of completing a program of salvation for the country and the restitution to the Portuguese people of the civil liberties of which they have been deprived.

To effect this, the government will be handed over

to a junta of national salvation, which will carry out the lines of the Armed Forces Movement plan, whose details will be given to the nation later.

As soon as possible there will be general elections for a constituent national assembly, whose powers, by its representation and free election, will permit the nation to choose freely its own form of social and political life.

In the certainty that the nation is with us, supporting our aims, and will accept with good grace the military government that will have to be in power in this phase of transition, the Movement of the Armed Forces calls for calm and patriotism from all Portuguese and expects the country to support the powers instituted for its benefit.

In this way we know we will have honored the past in respect of policies assumed before the nation and others, and we are fully conscious of having complied with the sacred duty of restoring the nation its legitimate and legal powers.

SOURCE: Christ Hunt, Portuguese Revolution, 1974-1976, p. 57.

ANNEX B
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
(MILITARY BALANCE)

SOURCE: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
"The Military Balance 1982-1983" (London: 1982), pp. 41-43.

SPAIN

Population: 37,900,000.
Military Service: 15 months.
Total armed forces: 347,000 (234,000 conscripts).
GDP 1981: pts 17,696 bn (\$191.7 bn).
Defence Expenditure 1981: pts 337.46 bn (\$3.65 bn).
GDP growth 1980: 1.2%
Inflation: 15.2% (1980), 14.5% (1981).
\$1=92.31 pesetas (1981)

Army: 255,000 (190,000 conscripts).

Immediate Intervention Force:

- 1 corps HQ.
- 1 armd div (with 2 bdes).
- 1 mot div (with 2 bdes).
- 1 mec div (with 2 bdes).
- 1 armd cav bde.
- 1 para bde (3 bns).
- 1 airportable bde.
- 1 arty bde.
- 1 locating, 1 fd rocket, 1 lt AA regts.
- 1 engr, 1 sigs, 1 chemical/nuclear defence regts.

Territorial Defence Force:

9 Military Regions, 4 overseas comds (see Overseas Forces).

- 2 mountain divs (each 1 bde + 1 cadre bde).
- 10 inf bdes (incl 1 Reserve bde).
- 1 high mountain bde.
- 1 arty bde (incl 1 HAWK SAM gp, 1 Nike Hercules bty).
- 2 hy arty regts.
- 7 coast/AA arty regts.

General Reserve Force:

- 1 ATK inf regt.
- 3 engr regts. (incl 2 railway).
- 1 sigs regt.

Independent Units:

Army HQ inf gp.

Royal Guard Regt (incl inf, naval, air force coys
and escort cav sqn).

Overseas Forces:

2 Commands: (Balearic, Canary Islands):

7 inf regts (1 cadre regt in Canaries).

3 Foreign Legion regts (9 bn, 1 lt cav gp).

6 coast/AA arty regts. 2 cdo, 2 special sea coys

2 engr regts, 1 engr gp (2 bn), 1 engr bn.

2 armd cav regts, 2 lt cav gps.

4 Regulares inf gps.

Army Aviation (FAMET):

HQ with 1 hel, 1 spt, 4 trg sqns, 2 hel bns.

1 attack bn.

1 tpt bn: 1 med, 1 hy coys.

Trg wing: 2 sqns; LHR-12B, HT-17, HU-10B hel.

AFV: 210 AMX-30, 390 M-47E, 130 M-48 (105mm)MBT;

180 M-41 lt tks; 60 AML-60, 80 AML-90 armd cars;

100 BMR-600 Pegaso MICV, 500 M-113 APC.

Arty: 860 105mm (incl M-56 pack), 200 122mm, 80

155mm, 24 203mm towed, 48 M-108 105 mm, 24 M-44,

24 M-109 155mm, 12 M107 175mm, 4 M-110 203mm,

SP guns/how; 200 88mm, 200 6-in. (152.4mm),

24 203mm, 12-in. (305mm), 15-in. (381mm) coast

guns; 18 150mm, 24 203mm, 381mm MRL; 60mm,

1,200 81mm, 107mm, 400 120mm mor.

ATK: 106mm RCL; M-65 88.9mm RL; Milan, Cobra, Dragon,
HOT ATGW.

AD: 54 35/90, 280 40/90, 120 90mm AA guns

Nike Hercules, Improved HAWK SAM.

Air: 3 Puma, 50 HU-8/-10B (UH-1B/H), 3 HA-16

(Alouette III). 30 HA-15 (BO-105), 1 AB-206A,

4 AB-212, 19 H-7B (OH-13), 12 HR-12B (OH-58A)

10 HT-17 (CH-47) hel.

(On order: 100 AMX-30 MBT; 150 BMR-600 MICV, 180

M-113 APC; 18 M-109 155mm SP how; 113 TOW ATGW;

96 Chaparral SAM (1,760 msls); 28 Skyguard AD

systems; 30 BO-105 (28 with HOT ATGW), 2 CH-47C,

18 OH-58A hel.)

DEPLOYMENT:

Balearic Islands: 5,800; 3 inf, 2 coast/AA regts, 1
engr bn, 1 lt cav gp, 1 cdo coy.

Canary Islands: 16,000; 3 inf, 1 Foreign Legion (incl
1 lt cav gp), 2 coast/AA regts, 1 engr gp (2 bns),
1 lt cav gp, 1 cdo coy.

Ceuta/Melilla: 19,000; 2 armd cav, 2 Foreign Legion,
2 coast/AA, 2 engr regts, 4 Regulares inf gps,
2 special sea coys.

Navy: 54,000, incl 11,000 marines (44,000 conscripts).

8 Commands: Combat, Escort, Amphibious, Naval Air, Submarine, Special Services and Patrol Units, Mine Warfare, Marines

8 Submarines: 1 Agosta, 4 Daphne, 3 ex-US Guppy IIA.

1 ex-US Independence ac carrier (7 AV-8A, 24 Hel).

11 destroyers: 6 with 1 hel (1 Marques de la Ensenada, 5 ex-US Gearing with 1 ASROC), 5 ex-US Fletcher.

20 Frigates: 8 Descubierta with 1X8 Sea Sparrow/Aspide SAM; 5 Balaeres with 16 Standard SAM, 1X8 ASROC; 1 Audaz, 1 Alava, 1 Pizarro, 4 Atrevida.

12 FAC(P): 6 Lazaga, 6 Barcelo.

20 large patrol craft (6 ex-minesweepers).

64 coastal and inshore patrol craft.

3 ex-US Aggressive ocean, 6 Jucar coastal MCM. .

2 Attack tpts, 1 LST, 7 LCT, 2 LCU, 18 LCM, 17 LCA, 43 LCVP.

(On order: 3 Agosta subs, 1 ac carrier, 3 FFG-7 frigates, Harpoon SSM, Aspide SAM.).

NAVAL AIR:

1 attack sqn with 9 AV-8A Matador, 2 TAV-8A.

1 coms sqn with 4 Commanche.

5 hel sqns with 15 SH-3D Sea King, 12 AB-212, 11 Bell 47G, 11 Hughes 500HM ASW, 4 AH-1G.

(On order: 8 AB-212, 18 SH-60B hel).

MARINES: (11,000)

1 marine bde (3 inf bns and spt units).

5 marine lt inf regts.

32 M-48S MBT; 48 Ontos AFV, each with 6 106mm RCL; LVTP-7 amph APC; 48 105mm SP how (trials); 81mm mor; M-72 66mm RL; 72 106mm RCL; TOW, Dragon ATGW.

Bases: El Ferrol (Galicia), Cadiz (San Fernando), Cartagena.

Air Force: 38,000; some 210 combat ac (being reduced).

Air Defence Command (MACOM):

3 wings

6 interceptor sqns: 2 with 36 F-4C, 4 F-4C;

2 with 21 Mirage IIIIE, 6IIIE; 2 with 47 Mirage F-1CE, 3 F-1CE/BE.

1 liaison flt with 6 Do-27.

Tactical Command (MATAC):

2 wings

2 FGA sqns: 1 with 6 F-5A, 9 RF-5A, 3 F-5B;

1 with 20 HA-220 Super Saeta.

1 recce sqn with 9 AR-10C (HA-220).

1 MR sqn with 1 P-3A, 4 P-3C.
 1 liaison flt with 6 O-1E, 12 Do-27, Do-28.
 AAM; Sparrow, Sidewinder, R-550 Magic.
 Air Command, Canary Islands (MACAN):
 1 FGA sqn with 14 F-5/RF-5A, 3 F-5B.
 1 SAR sqn with 3 F-27-400 MR ac, 8 AB-205 hel.
 1 tpt sqn with 7 CASA C-212, 2 Do-27.
 Transport Command (MATRA):
 3 wings.
 5 sqns with 8 C-130H, 4 KC-130H, 6 CASA 207 Azor,
 25 C-212 Aviocar, 12 DHC-4, 5 Do-27.
 Training Command (MAPER):
 2 OCU with 23 F-5A/B, 2 Do-27.
 14 SQNS with 6 Aztec, 29 F-33C Bonanza, 36 CASA
 C-101, 14 C-212E, 1 Navajo, 49 T-33A, 45 T-6,
 6 King Air, 3 Baron, BU-131A/CASAI-131.

 2 hel sqns with 28 HE-7A (AB-47), AB-205 Hughes
 300C and UH-1H hel.
 Air Force HQ Group (ACGA):
 2 tpt sqns with 2 DC-8-52, 4 Mystere 20, 1 Navajo,
 4 CASA C-212.
 2 spt sqns with 14 CL-215, 2 Do-27, 5 C-212.
 1 utility hel sqn with 5 Puma.
 2 SAR sqns with 4 CASA C-212, 4 Do-27 ac, 9 AB-205,
 4 AB-206, 3 AB-47, 3 Alouette III hel.
 1 trg sqn with 4 C-101, 2 C-212, 10 T-6.
 (On order: 21 Mirage F-1B/EE fighters; 2 P-3C Orion
 MR: 4 C-212 SAR, CASA C-101 trg ac; 12 Super Puma
 SAR, 17 Hughes 300C hel; 96 Improved Chaparral SAM
 launchers, 1,760 msls; Super Sidewinder AAM.).
 RESERVES (all services): 1,085,000. 1 ATK inf, 3
 engr, 1 sigs regts.

 Para-Military Forces: Guardia Civil 65,000: 26 inf
 regts, 3 reserve mobile comds, 1 railway security,
 1 traffic security gps, 1 anti-terrorist special gp
 (UAR), Policia Nacional 40,000. 26 inf bns, 2 cav
 sqn gps, 3 cav tps, 1 special ops cdo gp (GEO),
 Civil security gps.

PORTUGAL

Population: 9,800,000
 Military service: Army 16, Navy 24, Air Force
 21-24 months.
 Total armed forces: 66,426 (18,700 conscripts).
 GDP 1981: 1,358.0 bn escudos (\$22.063 bn).
 Estimated defence expenditure 1982: 49.87 bn.
 escudos (\$668.0 Om); NATO definition: \$844.2m.

GDP growth 1980: 5.5%
Inflation: 14.9% (1980), 23.9% (1981).
\$1=74.65 escudos (1982), 61.55 escudos (1981)

Army: 41,000 (10,000 conscripts, 3 intakes a year, 4 months alternating service).

6 Territorial Commands (4 military regions, 2 island commands).

1 mixed bde.

2 cav regts.

12 inf regts, 1 indep inf bn.

1 cdo regt.

2 fd, 1 AA, 1 coast arty regts.

2 indep AA/Coast arty bns.

2 engr regts.

1 sigs regt.

1 Special Forces, 4 spt, 1 MP bns.

62 M-42, 23 M-48A5 MBT; 11 M-24 lt tks; 33 Panhard EBR/ETT hy, 63 AML lt armd, 32 Ferrett MK 4 scout cars; 86 M-113, 82 Chaimite APC; 68 5.5in (140mm) guns; 54 M-101A1 105mm towed, 6 M-109A2 155mm SP how; 54 107mm, 82 120mm mor; 82 90mm, 127 106mm RCL; 21 TOW ATGW; 39 150mm, 152mm, 234mm coast arty; 16 20mm twin, 351 40mm AA guns.

Navy: 13,426 incl marines (5,200 conscripts).

3 Albacora (Fr. Daphne) submarines.

17 frigates: 4 Andrade, 5 Coutinho, 4 Belo, 3 Silva.

10 Cacine large patrol craft.

8 coastal patrol craft.

2 LCT, 11 LCM, 1 LCA.

(On order: 3 modified Kortenaer frigates).

Base: Lisbon (Alfeite).

MARINES: (2,687, 1,000 conscripts).

3 bns (2 inf, 1 police), spt units; Chaimite APC, mor, amph craft.

Air Force: 12,000, incl 2,500 para (3,500 conscripts); 87 combat aircraft.

1 combat, 5 administrative wings;

3 FGA sqns: 1 with 20 A-7P; 1 with 20 G-91R3, 8 G-91T3; 1 with 21 G-91R4, 2 G-91T3.

1 recce sqn with 4 CASA C-212B.

1 OCU with 12 T-28 COIN ac.

3 tpt sqns: 1 with 5 C-130H; 2 with 16 C-212 Aviocar.

2 SAR hel sqns with 11 SA-330 Puma.

2 hel/utility sqns with 34 Alouette III.

2 liaison sqns with 24 Reims-Cessna FTB337G.

3 trg sqns: 1 with 2 C-212A ac, 3 Alouette III hel; 1 with 24 T-37C; 1 with 30 Chipmunk.

1 para regt (3 bns).
(On order: 12 A-109A hel (4 with TOW).)

RESERVES (all services): 90,000.

Para-Military Forces: National Republican Guard
14,600: Commando Mk III APC. Public Security
Police 16,124: Fiscal Guard: 7,519.

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